fix(platform-wallet): act on swept transactions at the persistence seam - #4406
fix(platform-wallet): act on swept transactions at the persistence seam#4406romchornyi wants to merge 105 commits into
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Brings in dashpay/rust-dashcore#961, which stops a never-broadcast transaction from crediting money that does not exist, plus the seven commits ahead of the previous pin. #961 adds `WalletEvent::TransactionsSwept`, the first subtractive event on the wallet bus: it names transactions the wallet removed because a later, final transaction provably beat them to their inputs. Three consumers matched exhaustively on `WalletEvent` and now handle it. - The balance handler routes it like any other balance-bearing variant. A sweep is the one event that can lower the balance, and its snapshot is post-removal like every other; dropping it would leave the corrected-away amount on screen until some later event happened to arrive. - The DashPay payment hooks ignore it: it carries txids, not records. A sent payment whose transaction was swept stays `Pending` — the hooks only advance a payment forward, and inventing a failure transition is a change to the payment state machine, not to event routing. - The core bridge projects it into a new `CoreChangeSet.swept_txids`, the only subtractive field on that type, and `is_empty_no_records` counts it — that filter decides whether the persister is called at all, so a sweep-only round has to survive it on the strength of the txids alone. Nothing consumes `swept_txids` yet; the persistence seam follows.
The persistence seam had no way to say "this row is gone". Every field on the changeset was additive, so a swept transaction — a recorded spend that a later, final transaction beat to one of its inputs, and that can therefore never confirm — stayed on disk after Rust dropped it, came back at the next load, and re-created the balance the wallet had just corrected. That is the bug rust-dashcore#961 fixes, reappearing one layer up on every consumer that mirrors state. `WalletChangeSetFFI` gains `swept_txids`, wallet-scoped rather than per-account: the upstream event is wallet-scoped and the persister deletes by txid, so the row it deletes carries its own account link. Both persisters apply it the same way, after the additive part of the round — the transaction that beat the swept one to its inputs usually rides along in the same changeset, so by the time the removal runs its claim is already recorded: - the transaction row goes, and the outputs it created go with it (a cascade on both sides — SwiftData `PersistentTransaction.outputs`, the Room `txos.txid` foreign key); - the coins it claimed to *spend* are released first. The relationship only nils the link and would leave `isSpent` set, i.e. a coin marked spent by a transaction that no longer exists — invisible to the wallet and to the restore set, the same lost-funds shape as the phantom balance, inverted. On Android the release has to run before the delete: once the FK nulls `spendingTxid` there is nothing left to find those rows by. Transaction rows are keyed by txid alone and shared across wallets by design, and a sweep is a statement about the transaction rather than about one wallet's view of it, so neither persister narrows the delete to the emitting wallet.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe wallet changeset now carries ordered swept transaction IDs, superseding transaction IDs, and released outpoints. Rust exposes them through FFI and JNI. Kotlin, Swift, and SQLite persistence handlers remove swept transactions and update related TXO spend claims. ChangesSwept transaction persistence
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to This change removes swept transactions and releases their spend claims, but the Android persistence path can still clear a newer spend claim in a coalesced update, restoring a coin that should remain spent and leaving wallet state incorrect. The test buffer-lifetime issue should also be corrected before merging. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant CoreChangeSet
participant WalletChangeSetFFI
participant tramp_persist_wallet_changeset
participant PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler
participant TxoDao
CoreChangeSet->>WalletChangeSetFFI: expose ordered sweep batches
WalletChangeSetFFI->>tramp_persist_wallet_changeset: provide sweep data
tramp_persist_wallet_changeset->>PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler: invoke sweep callback
PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler->>TxoDao: hold swept inputs and release outpoints
PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler-->>tramp_persist_wallet_changeset: return persistence status
Possibly related PRs
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⛔ Blockers found — Opus deferred (commit 4fee0e8) |
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## v4.2-dev #4406 +/- ##
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- Coverage 87.38% 86.71% -0.68%
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Files 2735 2735
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- Hits 303858 303683 -175
- Misses 43862 46542 +2680
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Preliminary review — Codex only
Verified two in-scope persistence defects at the exact PR head. The sweep projection can restore an output already consumed by an irrelevant winning transaction, and the Swift path can silently acknowledge a sweep whose required fetch failed; both undermine the durability guarantee this PR introduces.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and is not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 2 blocking
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In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:728-730: Preserve the winner's spent input when it is irrelevant to the wallet
The pinned rust-dashcore explicitly allows a final winner to sweep a loser even when the winner is classified as irrelevant. Its `test_an_irrelevant_winner_still_sweeps_its_loser` covers a winner that spends the wallet's funding output but pays only external addresses, so no `TransactionDetected` record is emitted for that winner. Upstream's sweep deliberately retains the winner's shared inputs in `spent_outpoints`, but this projection carries only the loser txids while the Swift and Kotlin persisters release every input claim attached to each loser. After restart, the consumed funding TXO is therefore included in the unspent restore set, and there is no winner record to mark it spent again. The persistence seam must carry enough information to retain winner-consumed outpoints while releasing only the loser's extra inputs, and the irrelevant-winner scenario needs end-to-end persistence coverage.
In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift:866: Do not treat a failed sweep fetch as an unknown txid
`try?` maps both a successful empty fetch and a thrown SwiftData fetch to the same no-op. If the fetch throws, the required transaction deletion is skipped, but `persistWalletChangesetCallback` still returns success and `endChangeset` may save the round successfully. Rust then treats the subtractive changeset as durable and clears it, leaving the swept transaction available for replay on the next wallet load. Make the sweep lookup throwing, propagate its failure through `persistWalletChangesetCallback`, and let the failed changeset round roll back; only a successful fetch with no matching row should remain an idempotent no-op.
| // No `spent_utxos` entry for the inputs: the winner's own record | ||
| // flows through `TransactionDetected` / `BlockProcessed` and | ||
| // claims them. This arm only names the dead. |
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🔴 Blocking: Preserve the winner's spent input when it is irrelevant to the wallet
The pinned rust-dashcore explicitly allows a final winner to sweep a loser even when the winner is classified as irrelevant. Its test_an_irrelevant_winner_still_sweeps_its_loser covers a winner that spends the wallet's funding output but pays only external addresses, so no TransactionDetected record is emitted for that winner. Upstream's sweep deliberately retains the winner's shared inputs in spent_outpoints, but this projection carries only the loser txids while the Swift and Kotlin persisters release every input claim attached to each loser. After restart, the consumed funding TXO is therefore included in the unspent restore set, and there is no winner record to mark it spent again. The persistence seam must carry enough information to retain winner-consumed outpoints while releasing only the loser's extra inputs, and the irrelevant-winner scenario needs end-to-end persistence coverage.
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in 49e5a5f — Preserve the winner's spent input when it is irrelevant to the wallet no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
| ) | ||
| descriptor.fetchLimit = 1 | ||
| descriptor.relationshipKeyPathsForPrefetching = [\.inputs] | ||
| guard let row = try? backgroundContext.fetch(descriptor).first else { return } |
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🔴 Blocking: Do not treat a failed sweep fetch as an unknown txid
try? maps both a successful empty fetch and a thrown SwiftData fetch to the same no-op. If the fetch throws, the required transaction deletion is skipped, but persistWalletChangesetCallback still returns success and endChangeset may save the round successfully. Rust then treats the subtractive changeset as durable and clears it, leaving the swept transaction available for replay on the next wallet load. Make the sweep lookup throwing, propagate its failure through persistWalletChangesetCallback, and let the failed changeset round roll back; only a successful fetch with no matching row should remain an idempotent no-op.
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in 49e5a5f — Do not treat a failed sweep fetch as an unknown txid no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
… throws Two findings. **A released input could be one the winner consumed.** Upstream is explicit that a sweep frees only the loser's *extra* inputs — "a loser spending A+B against a winner spending only A must leave A marked and free B" — and the winner does not have to be wallet-relevant: `test_an_irrelevant_winner_ still_sweeps_its_loser` covers a winner that spends our funding output and pays entirely to outside addresses, so no record for it ever reaches the persister. Both persisters released every claim the loser held, so after a restart that consumed coin came back in the unspent restore set with no winner record left to re-spend it. The changeset now carries the pairing: `CoreChangeSet.swept_transactions` (and `SweptTransactionFFI`) name the removed transaction *and* the transaction that settled its inputs. That is enough to tell the two kinds apart without shipping the winner's input list: - a wallet-relevant winner has re-pointed the shared inputs at itself earlier in the same round, so releasing whatever still points at the loser releases exactly the loser's extras; - a winner absent from the store is the irrelevant case, where nothing distinguishes them — so the claims stand. The wallet holds no UTXO for either kind either, and upstream documents a rescan as the recovery path for the freed ones. Keeping a coin out of the restore set is recoverable; handing back one the chain has already spent is not. **A failed fetch read as "no such transaction".** `try?` collapsed a SwiftData failure into the same no-op as a successful miss, and the round still reported success — Rust would clear the sweep while the row it named survived to be replayed at the next load. The lookups throw now, and `persistWalletChangeset` returns a failure the C shim forwards, so the round rolls back. Tests: the irrelevant-winner scenario end to end on both persisters, plus the A/B split, on top of the existing deletion coverage.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The Swift fetch-failure path is now correctly propagated so a failed sweep rolls back instead of being acknowledged as durable. However, the irrelevant-winner path still restores a consumed funding output after restart because the seam carries only the winner txid, while production sweep losers are unconfirmed and their persisted inputs remain marked unspent.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
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In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:740-745: Preserve the winner's spent input when it is irrelevant to the wallet
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3783319383)
Pairing each loser with only `superseded_by` does not preserve the outpoints consumed by an irrelevant winner. The pinned rust-dashcore sweep selects only losers for which `!record.is_confirmed()` and explicitly removes the winner's inputs from the set it releases. Both persistence adapters, however, set `isSpent` only when the spending transaction reaches an in-block context, so a real mempool or InstantSend loser has its input linked to the loser while `isSpent` remains `false`. If the winner is irrelevant, no winner record reaches the store; Swift and Kotlin therefore skip `releaseSpendClaim`, delete the loser, and let the relationship or foreign key become null while the already-false `isSpent` flag remains unchanged. The next restore query includes that consumed output as spendable. The new irrelevant-winner tests mask this path by seeding the loser with context `2` (`InBlock`) and `isSpent = true`, but upstream excludes confirmed records from sweeping. Carry the winner's consumed outpoints, or equivalent authoritative spent-state information, across the persistence seam so shared inputs are explicitly kept spent while only loser-exclusive inputs are released; this must not depend on a winner record being persisted in the same round.
The previous round paired each loser with its winner but still leaned on the winner's record to keep the shared input spent, and that only works when such a record exists. It usually does not look like the tests said it did. Upstream sweeps only *unconfirmed* records (`!record.is_confirmed()`), and both mirrors flip `isSpent` solely for a spender that reached a block — so a real swept loser holds its inputs by link alone, `isSpent == false`. Deleting the loser nils the link, and every coin it named, the winner's included, fell straight back into the restore query (`isSpent == false`). The earlier tests hid this by seeding the loser at `InBlock` with `isSpent = true`, a state upstream never sweeps. So the branch that cannot prove anything now holds rather than releases: - winner present in the store — it is wallet-relevant, its record has already re-pointed the inputs it took at itself, so what still points at the loser is the loser's own and stays spendable; - winner absent — it pays only to outside addresses and is never recorded. Nothing separates the coin it consumed from the loser's extras, so all of them are marked spent with no spender named, keeping them out of the restore set. The wallet holds no UTXO for either kind either. Handing back a coin the chain has already spent is the one outcome that cannot be undone from here, which is why the uncertainty resolves that way — and the hold is not permanent: the wallet is authoritative about which coins are free, and the utxo-added path now clears a mark that has no spender behind it, so a rescan re-delivering a coin releases it. Tests now model the unconfirmed loser upstream actually sweeps, and cover the release path, the hold, and the re-delivery that lifts it, on both persisters.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The current head fixes the prior over-crediting path by keeping unresolved loser inputs out of the restore set. Two blocking persistence defects remain: the mobile handlers can strand loser-exclusive inputs based on event timing, and the canonical SQLite persister ignores the new subtractive field entirely.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 2 blocking
1 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
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In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:740-745: Do not hold loser-exclusive inputs when the winner record is absent
Winner-row presence is not a reliable way to distinguish shared inputs from loser-exclusive inputs. The upstream block path emits `TransactionsSwept` for each winning transaction before the later `BlockProcessed` event, while `run_wallet_event_adapter` stops its non-waiting drain as soon as `try_recv` observes an empty channel. The sweep can therefore be committed before a wallet-relevant winner has been queued or persisted. For a loser spending A+B and a winner spending only A, both mobile handlers then mark A and B spent without a spender. The later winner record re-points A but never touches B, leaving the genuinely unspent B permanently excluded from ordinary cold-start restoration. An irrelevant winner produces the same unresolved state without any later record, and normal synchronization resumes from the persisted height rather than replaying the historical funding transaction. Carry the winner-consumed outpoints, or the exact loser-input release set computed upstream, so persistence can retain A and release B independently of transaction-row timing.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:17-22: Apply transaction sweeps in the SQLite persister
This PR makes `swept_transactions` a non-empty part of `CoreChangeSet`, but the canonical `SqlitePersister`'s `apply` function never reads it. A sweep-only changeset is therefore accepted and flushed successfully while the dead row remains in `core_transactions`, its created outputs remain in `core_utxos`, and its input state remains unchanged. This defeats the subtractive persistence guarantee for this first-party backend. It can also leave an InstantSend loser visible through `get_core_tx_record`, which sent-payment reconciliation treats as final and can use to advance a dead DashPay payment to `Confirmed`. Apply each sweep transactionally by removing the loser record and outputs and updating shared versus loser-exclusive inputs using authoritative outpoint information, with coverage for a sweep-only SQLite round.
| swept_transactions: txids | ||
| .iter() | ||
| .map(|txid| SweptTransaction { | ||
| txid: *txid, | ||
| superseded_by: *superseded_by, | ||
| }) |
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🔴 Blocking: Do not hold loser-exclusive inputs when the winner record is absent
Winner-row presence is not a reliable way to distinguish shared inputs from loser-exclusive inputs. The upstream block path emits TransactionsSwept for each winning transaction before the later BlockProcessed event, while run_wallet_event_adapter stops its non-waiting drain as soon as try_recv observes an empty channel. The sweep can therefore be committed before a wallet-relevant winner has been queued or persisted. For a loser spending A+B and a winner spending only A, both mobile handlers then mark A and B spent without a spender. The later winner record re-points A but never touches B, leaving the genuinely unspent B permanently excluded from ordinary cold-start restoration. An irrelevant winner produces the same unresolved state without any later record, and normal synchronization resumes from the persisted height rather than replaying the historical funding transaction. Carry the winner-consumed outpoints, or the exact loser-input release set computed upstream, so persistence can retain A and release B independently of transaction-row timing.
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in b57fb20 — Do not hold loser-exclusive inputs when the winner record is absent no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
Inferring the split from the winner's row was wrong twice over, and the second way is not fixable downstream: the block path emits `TransactionsSwept` per winning transaction *before* the `BlockProcessed` that carries the winner's record, and `run_wallet_event_adapter` ends its non-waiting drain as soon as `try_recv` sees an empty channel. So a sweep can commit a whole round before a wallet-relevant winner is even queued. For a loser spending A+B against a winner taking only A, both mobile handlers then held A and B; the winner's later record re-pointed A and never touched B, stranding a genuinely unspent coin outside cold-start restoration for good. Upstream already draws the line and now reports it (rust-dashcore#961's `release_spent_marks`, exposed by dashpay/rust-dashcore#962): the pin moves to 51eafd8c and `WalletEvent::TransactionsSwept.released_outpoints` names the inputs no surviving transaction spends. That set flows through `CoreChangeSet.swept_released_outpoints` and `WalletChangeSetFFI` to all three persisters, which now apply it verbatim — an outpoint it names goes back to spendable, every other input the removed transaction claimed stays spent, and neither depends on when the winner's record shows up or whether it exists at all. Also fixes the second blocker: the canonical SQLite persister ignored `swept_transactions` entirely, so a sweep-only round flushed successfully while the dead row stayed in `core_transactions`, its outputs in `core_utxos`, and its inputs untouched — leaving an InstantSend loser answerable through `get_core_tx_record`, which sent-payment reconciliation reads as final and would use to advance a dead DashPay payment to `Confirmed`. `core_state::apply` now applies sweeps in the same transaction as the rest of the round. The Swift and Kotlin backstop stays: a coin marked spent with no spender on record is cleared when the wallet re-delivers it as a UTXO, so a rescan still recovers anything an older row was left holding.
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Inline comments:
In
`@packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/dao/TxoDao.kt`:
- Around line 64-74: Restrict TxoDao.releaseByOutpoint to update only rows whose
spendingTxid is already null, preventing it from clearing a later spend claim.
In PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler lines 1035-1043, retain the existing
hold-then-release order; no direct change is needed because the DAO predicate
protects later claims.
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📒 Files selected for processing (11)
Cargo.tomlpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/ffi/NativePersistenceBridge.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/dao/TxoDao.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/test/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandlerTest.ktpackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/core_wallet_types.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/changeset.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rspackages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rspackages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swiftpackages/swift-sdk/SwiftTests/SwiftDashSDKTests/SweptTransactionPersistTests.swift
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (5)
- Cargo.toml
- packages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rs
- packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/test/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandlerTest.kt
- packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs
- packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift
…aimed `releaseByOutpoint` matched on the outpoint alone, so it cleared whatever spend claim the row happened to hold. A round can carry both a release and a later transaction that legitimately spends the freed coin — merging folds several events together, and every record is written before sweeps are processed — so by the time the release ran the coin could already be claimed again. Clearing that claim put a spent coin back in the restore set, which is the failure the sweep handling exists to prevent. Restrict the update to rows with `spendingTxid IS NULL`. Paired with the existing hold-then-release order that is exactly the right set: holding detaches the rows this round's removals still claim, so only those qualify, while a row a live transaction claims keeps it. Swift never had this: `applySweptTransaction` walks `PersistentTransaction.inputs`, the inverse of `spendingTransaction`, so it only ever touches rows still pointing at the removed transaction. Keying the Kotlin query on the outpoint is what lost that property.
…persister `swept_transactions` became a non-empty part of `CoreChangeSet`, but `core_state::apply` never read it. A sweep-only changeset was therefore accepted and flushed successfully while the dead row stayed in `core_transactions`, the outputs it created stayed in `core_utxos`, and its input state was untouched — the subtractive guarantee simply did not hold for this first-party backend. It also left an InstantSend loser answerable through `get_core_tx_record`, which sent-payment reconciliation treats as final and can use to advance a dead DashPay payment to `Confirmed`. Apply each sweep in the same transaction as the rest of the round, after the additive writes: delete the removed transaction and the UTXOs it created, then resolve the coins it claimed to spend from `swept_released_outpoints` — an outpoint named there goes back to spendable, every other input it claimed stays spent because the transaction that beat it took them. Each input is written outright rather than only when it changes, since a coin the sweep did not free must end the round out of the unspent query even when nothing had marked it spent yet: upstream sweeps only unconfirmed records, whose spends this schema does not mark.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The current head resolves both prior blockers by carrying authoritative released outpoints through the persistence seam and applying sweeps in SQLite. A blocking SQLite merge-order defect remains, and SQLite sweep cleanup also leaves stale InstantLock rows behind.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol; openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:216-220: Do not release an outpoint a later record already reclaimed
`swept_released_outpoints` describes wallet state when each sweep event was emitted, but the event adapter can merge that event with a later transaction that spends one of the newly freed coins. SQLite applies every `spent_utxos` entry first, setting the coin to `spent = 1`, and then this unconditional assignment sets it back to `spent = 0` because the outpoint remains in the merged release set. Unlike the Kotlin backend, SQLite does not retain the identity of the current spender, so the persisted mirror incorrectly exposes a coin consumed by the later transaction as unspent. Before releasing an outpoint, preserve any claim made by a non-swept transaction record in the same changeset, and add the SQLite equivalent of `aReleasedCoinAlreadyReclaimedInTheSameRoundKeepsItsNewSpender`.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:190-193: Delete the swept transaction's persisted InstantLock
A swept loser can be InstantSend-locked when the winning transaction is chainlocked: the pinned upstream precedence rules explicitly allow a chainlocked arrival to evict an IS-locked loser. Such a loser may therefore have a row in `core_instant_locks`, but that table has no foreign key or deletion trigger tied to `core_transactions`. Deleting only the transaction leaves stale auxiliary state indefinitely. Delete the matching InstantLock in the same SQLite transaction as the swept transaction.
| spend_stmt.execute(params![ | ||
| wallet_id.as_slice(), | ||
| &key[..], | ||
| !released.contains(&outpoint) | ||
| ])?; |
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🔴 Blocking: Do not release an outpoint a later record already reclaimed
swept_released_outpoints describes wallet state when each sweep event was emitted, but the event adapter can merge that event with a later transaction that spends one of the newly freed coins. SQLite applies every spent_utxos entry first, setting the coin to spent = 1, and then this unconditional assignment sets it back to spent = 0 because the outpoint remains in the merged release set. Unlike the Kotlin backend, SQLite does not retain the identity of the current spender, so the persisted mirror incorrectly exposes a coin consumed by the later transaction as unspent. Before releasing an outpoint, preserve any claim made by a non-swept transaction record in the same changeset, and add the SQLite equivalent of aReleasedCoinAlreadyReclaimedInTheSameRoundKeepsItsNewSpender.
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in b172c0a — Do not release an outpoint a later record already reclaimed no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
… claim Two defects in the SQLite sweep, both found in review. The release was applied unconditionally. A round can carry both a release and a later transaction that legitimately spends the freed coin — merging folds several events together, and every record is written before sweeps are processed — so the coin could already be claimed again by the time the sweep ran, and setting `spent = 0` handed a consumed coin back to the unspent query. The mobile mirrors settle this by looking at who currently claims the row, but `core_utxos` never records that: `spent_in_txid` stays null on every write path. The changeset carries the answer instead — a record in this round that is not itself being swept and spends a released outpoint is the live claim — so the release now defers to it. This is the SQLite half of the same defect fixed on the Kotlin side by `spendingTxid IS NULL`. Second, a swept transaction's InstantLock row survived it. A chainlocked winner may evict an InstantSend-locked loser, so a swept transaction can own a row in `core_instant_locks`, and nothing ties that table to `core_transactions` — no foreign key, no trigger. Delete it in the same transaction. Both regressions are covered, and both tests were confirmed to fail without their fix.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The exact head fixes both prior SQLite findings by protecting claims from surviving records and deleting swept transactions' InstantLock rows. However, coalescing multiple ordered sweep events still unions their release sets, allowing an earlier release to override a later sweep that retained the same outpoint as spent; this affects every persistence backend and remains blocking.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/changeset.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/changeset.rs:410-417: Do not union release decisions across ordered sweeps
A released outpoint describes wallet state at one specific `TransactionsSwept` event; it is not a monotonic property of the whole adapter drain. For example, one sweep can release B, a later unconfirmed wallet-relevant transaction can claim B, and a final wallet-irrelevant transaction can consume B while sweeping that later claimant. If those events are already buffered, this merge retains the first event's release of B while the later claimant appears in both `records` and `swept_transactions`. SQLite therefore excludes that claimant from `claimed_by_survivors`, and the mobile handlers detach all swept claims before applying the same global release set, so all backends persist B as unspent even though the final winner consumed it. Preserve each ordered sweep event's release information, or carry equivalent ordering and attribution so a later retained input overrides an earlier release.
| // The released set folds the same way: a coalesced round frees a coin | ||
| // once however many sweeps named it. | ||
| if !other.swept_released_outpoints.is_empty() { | ||
| let mut seen: std::collections::HashSet<OutPoint> = | ||
| self.swept_released_outpoints.iter().copied().collect(); | ||
| for outpoint in other.swept_released_outpoints { | ||
| if seen.insert(outpoint) { | ||
| self.swept_released_outpoints.push(outpoint); |
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🔴 Blocking: Do not union release decisions across ordered sweeps
A released outpoint describes wallet state at one specific TransactionsSwept event; it is not a monotonic property of the whole adapter drain. For example, one sweep can release B, a later unconfirmed wallet-relevant transaction can claim B, and a final wallet-irrelevant transaction can consume B while sweeping that later claimant. If those events are already buffered, this merge retains the first event's release of B while the later claimant appears in both records and swept_transactions. SQLite therefore excludes that claimant from claimed_by_survivors, and the mobile handlers detach all swept claims before applying the same global release set, so all backends persist B as unspent even though the final winner consumed it. Preserve each ordered sweep event's release information, or carry equivalent ordering and attribution so a later retained input overrides an earlier release.
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in 04a76c4 — Do not union release decisions across ordered sweeps no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
A release is only true of the wallet the sweep that made it saw — it is not a property of the whole drain. The adapter folds every event buffered in one pass into a single changeset, so two sweeps that disagree were being reconciled by unioning their release sets, and the earlier answer won. The shape that breaks: a sweep frees B, a later transaction spends B, and a final winner consumes B while sweeping that spender. The second sweep frees nothing, precisely because its winner took B. Unioned, B stays in the release set; the spender is in `swept_transactions`, so SQLite excludes it from `claimed_by_survivors` and the mobile handlers detach its claim before applying the same global set. All three backends then persist a coin the chain consumed as spendable. Replace `swept_transactions` + `swept_released_outpoints` with `sweeps: Vec<SweepBatch>`, each carrying its own removals, winner and release set, merged by appending rather than folding. Every backend applies them in sequence, so a later batch corrects the one before it — which is what the wallet itself did. The FFI mirrors the nesting (`SweepBatchFFI`), and JNI now makes one bridge call per batch, so the Kotlin handler's signature is unchanged and its existing hold-then-release gives the ordering for free. Regression coverage on all three backends plus the merge itself, each confirmed to fail against the folded set.
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Inline comments:
In
`@packages/swift-sdk/SwiftTests/SwiftDashSDKTests/SweptTransactionPersistTests.swift`:
- Around line 175-190: Update the FFI batch construction around SweepBatchFFI so
persistWalletChangeset is invoked while each txidStorage and releasedStorage
buffer-pointer closure is active, or replace those transient pointers with
explicitly allocated storage that remains valid through the call; ensure all
entry pointers remain valid for the entire persistence operation.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
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📒 Files selected for processing (9)
packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/test/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandlerTest.ktpackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/core_wallet_types.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/tests/sqlite_transaction_sweeps.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/changeset.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rspackages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rspackages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swiftpackages/swift-sdk/SwiftTests/SwiftDashSDKTests/SweptTransactionPersistTests.swift
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (5)
- packages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rs
- packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs
- packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs
- packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/test/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandlerTest.kt
- packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The ordered sweep batches fix the prior release-set union defect, but record arrivals are still separated from sweeps during merging, allowing a final reinstated transaction to be deleted by an earlier buffered sweep. The new Swift persistence test helper also uses nested array pointers after their guaranteed lifetimes end.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/changeset.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/changeset.rs:377-381: Preserve record arrivals relative to ordered sweeps
Appending sweep batches preserves their order only relative to other sweeps; transaction records remain in a separate vector, and SQLite, Swift, and Kotlin all apply every record before replaying every sweep. The pinned wallet permits a chainlocked transaction to evict an InstantSend-locked conflict. Therefore, an unconfirmed X can first be swept when IS-locked A arrives, then return chainlocked and sweep A. If those events are drained together, the changeset contains records for A and the final X plus sweeps `[delete X, delete A]`. Applying all records first and then both sweeps deletes both rows, including the terminal X and its outputs, even though the in-memory wallet retained X. Preserve ordering across record and sweep operations, or carry equivalent last-operation information per txid so a record emitted after its earlier sweep survives.
In `packages/swift-sdk/SwiftTests/SwiftDashSDKTests/SweptTransactionPersistTests.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/SwiftTests/SwiftDashSDKTests/SweptTransactionPersistTests.swift:178-184: Keep the test FFI buffers alive through persistence
`buf.baseAddress` is stored in `SweepBatchFFI` and used by `persistWalletChangeset` after each `withUnsafeMutableBufferPointer` closure has returned. Keeping the containing arrays in local variables does not extend the pointer lifetime guaranteed by that API, so this test helper can pass dangling pointers to the FFI consumer. Invoke persistence while all required buffer closures are active, using nested lifetime scopes, or allocate explicitly owned buffers and release them after the call.
| txidStorage[i].withUnsafeMutableBufferPointer { buf in | ||
| entry.txids = buf.baseAddress | ||
| entry.txids_count = UInt(buf.count) | ||
| } | ||
| releasedStorage[i].withUnsafeMutableBufferPointer { buf in | ||
| entry.released_outpoints = buf.baseAddress | ||
| entry.released_outpoints_count = UInt(buf.count) |
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🟡 Suggestion: Keep the test FFI buffers alive through persistence
buf.baseAddress is stored in SweepBatchFFI and used by persistWalletChangeset after each withUnsafeMutableBufferPointer closure has returned. Keeping the containing arrays in local variables does not extend the pointer lifetime guaranteed by that API, so this test helper can pass dangling pointers to the FFI consumer. Invoke persistence while all required buffer closures are active, using nested lifetime scopes, or allocate explicitly owned buffers and release them after the call.
source: ['coderabbit']
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Resolved in 0d81ce1 — Keep the test FFI buffers alive through persistence no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
Ordering the sweep batches fixed them relative to each other, but records still sit in their own vector and every persister writes all of them before replaying any sweep. So a transaction removed by a buffered sweep and then recorded again in the same round was deleted anyway, along with its outputs, while the in-memory wallet had kept it. Reachable through IS-lock precedence, which the pinned wallet permits: an unconfirmed transaction is swept when an IS-locked conflict arrives, then comes back chainlocked and sweeps that conflict in turn. One drain then holds records for both plus removals for both. Merging now drops a reinstated txid from any sweep already buffered — the record is the newer fact — and drops the batch entirely once nothing is left to remove. The batch's release set goes with it: it described a wallet in which that transaction was gone, and leaving those coins spent is the recoverable direction, since the wallet re-delivers a genuinely free one as a UTXO while a coin handed back that the chain consumed cannot be taken away again. Also fixes the Swift test helper, which stored `baseAddress` from `withUnsafeMutableBufferPointer` in the FFI structs and used it after those closures returned — a dangling pointer the FFI consumer then read. The buffers are allocated explicitly and freed after the call.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The latest commit resolves both prior findings: reinstated transaction records now survive earlier buffered sweeps, and the Swift test keeps its FFI buffers alive through persistence. Two blocking durability gaps remain: partially reinstating a multi-loser sweep discards releases for losers that remain swept, and unresolved winner-consumed inputs lose their only durable claim when the loser is deleted.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 2 blocking
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/changeset.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/changeset.rs:291-296: Keep releases belonging to losers that remain swept
A sweep batch can contain multiple losers, while `released_outpoints` is the aggregate release set for all of them. When a later record reinstates only one loser, this code removes that txid but clears releases that still apply to the losers remaining in the batch. For example, winner A can sweep X and Y, where Y also spends C and A does not, causing the batch to release C. If X later returns chainlocked, the batch retains Y but loses C; replaying the remaining sweep then marks C spent even though no final winner consumed it. Preserve the aggregate release set when only some txids are removed. The backends already scope releases to the remaining losers' inputs or protect claims held by surviving records, so releases unrelated to the remaining losers are inert.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:246-256: Persist retained spends when the funding TXO is not present yet
The sweep preserves a winner-consumed input only by updating an existing `core_utxos` row. A wallet-relevant loser can be persisted before one of its funding outputs is materialized; the mobile handlers explicitly support this ordering with pending-input rows, and SQLite can likewise have no row when the record lacks a classified input detail. If an irrelevant final winner then sweeps the loser, the input is intentionally absent from `released_outpoints`, but this update affects zero rows and deleting the loser removes the only durable description of the claim. Swift and Kotlin have the same failure because deleting the loser cascades its pending-input rows. After restart, the upstream observed-spend state is not reconstructed from the persistence seam, so a later funding scan can insert the consumed output as unspent. Before deleting the loser, preserve every unresolved non-released input as a durable claim associated with `superseded_by` or an equivalent tombstone, and cover spend-before-funding followed by sweep, restart, and funding arrival across all three backends.
| for batch in &mut self.sweeps { | ||
| let before = batch.txids.len(); | ||
| batch.txids.retain(|txid| !reinstated.contains(txid)); | ||
| if batch.txids.len() != before { | ||
| batch.released_outpoints.clear(); | ||
| } |
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🔴 Blocking: Keep releases belonging to losers that remain swept
A sweep batch can contain multiple losers, while released_outpoints is the aggregate release set for all of them. When a later record reinstates only one loser, this code removes that txid but clears releases that still apply to the losers remaining in the batch. For example, winner A can sweep X and Y, where Y also spends C and A does not, causing the batch to release C. If X later returns chainlocked, the batch retains Y but loses C; replaying the remaining sweep then marks C spent even though no final winner consumed it. Preserve the aggregate release set when only some txids are removed. The backends already scope releases to the remaining losers' inputs or protect claims held by surviving records, so releases unrelated to the remaining losers are inert.
| for batch in &mut self.sweeps { | |
| let before = batch.txids.len(); | |
| batch.txids.retain(|txid| !reinstated.contains(txid)); | |
| if batch.txids.len() != before { | |
| batch.released_outpoints.clear(); | |
| } | |
| for batch in &mut self.sweeps { | |
| batch.txids.retain(|txid| !reinstated.contains(txid)); | |
| } |
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in 46f74e9 — Keep releases belonging to losers that remain swept no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
`released_outpoints` is the aggregate for every loser in the batch, so clearing it on reinstatement discarded coins freed by the losers that are still going: a winner sweeping X and Y, where only Y also spends C, releases C — and X returning chainlocked left the batch keeping Y but losing C, so replaying it marked C spent though no final winner took it. Keep the set. Entries belonging to the reinstated transaction are inert on every backend: each scopes its release to the remaining losers' own inputs, or withholds any outpoint a surviving record claims — and the reinstating record is exactly such a claim.
A wallet-relevant loser can be persisted before one of its own funding outputs is materialized: the mobile handlers stage that spend as a pending-input row, and SQLite simply has no `core_utxos` row for the outpoint yet. When a later, unresolved-elsewhere winner sweeps that loser and does not release the input, every backend tried to update a row that did not exist — a no-op — then deleted the loser, which was the only place the claim lived. A pending-input row is cascade-owned by the transaction that created it, so it went with the loser too. Once the funding transaction was finally observed, even after a restart, its ordinary UTXO upsert had nothing telling it the coin was already spoken for, and inserted it back as spendable. Give the claim somewhere durable to live before deleting the loser. SQLite's `core_utxos.spent_in_txid` column already existed for exactly this and was never populated on any write path; `apply_sweep` now writes it for a held input with no existing row (a placeholder row the real funding upsert fills in later) and for one that does exist, and `execute_upsert_utxo`'s ON CONFLICT clause refuses to clear `spent` while it's set. Swift and Kotlin get the mobile-appropriate version: a held pending input is detached from its doomed loser (so the cascade-delete no longer reaches it) and repointed at the winner, flagged so the funding TXO's own later upsert forces `isSpent` unconditionally and stamps a new `supersededByTxid` column rather than waiting on the winner's own row to resolve. That column is deliberately not the same "no spender on record" state a plain held coin gets — clearing `isSpent` when the wallet re-delivers a coin as a UTXO stays gated on no spender *and* no superseding txid, so the existing recovery path for an unresolved sweep is untouched. Regression coverage on all three backends: seed the pending spend, sweep it holding the input, drop and reopen the store/persister, then let the funding UTXO arrive — the coin must not become spendable. Each was confirmed to fail without its half of the fix. Kotlin's schema move (`txos.supersededByTxid`, `pending_inputs.isSweptTombstone`) ships as Room migration v10→v11 with exported-schema and migration-path coverage.
The PersistentPendingInput row applySweptTransaction repurposes as a durable claim (isSweptTombstone) never drains when its outpoint is a foreign input of a swept incoming payment — no funding TXO ever arrives — so it was permanent junk an attacker could grow one row per input by repeatedly double-spending payments at the wallet: the SwiftData half of the same exposure the SQLite store's core_utxos placeholder carried (#4406). Ownership cannot be proven at creation (dashpay/rust-dashcore#968), so bound the row's lifetime instead, mirroring the SQLite store's collect_finalized_tombstones: - heldSinceHeight (optional, lightweight-migrated) stamps a tombstone with the wallet's synced height when a sweep flags it and re-stamps it when a chained sweep re-points it; - persistWalletChangeset collects tombstones once the synced height clears their stamp by a 2-block margin, back-filling unstamped (pre-property) rows with the current height first, and only after a chainlock has been applied — the chainlock's own height is bincode-opaque on this side of the FFI, so the boundary is the synced height, the filter-coverage half of the upstream doctrine. A genuine claim is untouched: its funding TXO's arrival drains the hold onto the PersistentTxo and deletes the pending rows, leaving nothing for the collector to see.
…into its own PR Remove the bit-11 behavioral block so the funds-critical sweep core — pin bump, producer arm, watermark gate, SQLite/Swift/Kotlin persisters — can converge on its own: SweptPaymentFlips and the evidence-classed resolver in payments.rs, the adapter's flip staging with its same-fold retraction, rollback ledger, cross-drain re-validation (commit_batch_with_payment_revalidation) and WalletBatch::payments_overlay, and the ROUND_COUPLED_PAYMENT_FLIPS composite. The block returns unchanged as a stacked follow-up PR that carries its review findings together with their regression tests. What stays is the seam the extracted PR plugs back into: capability bits 10 and 11 with their FFI derivations and gate tests, the commit_batch/commit_wallet factoring, and the payment_handler no-op arms with their pinning test — a sweep still must not drive the payment hooks, whichever PR the flip lands in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The prior permanent-growth mechanism is now bounded, but the replacement cleanup can delete a genuine unresolved spend hold based only on elapsed height, allowing an InstantSend-consumed output to reappear after restart. One blocking persistence defect remains, along with the carried-forward balance-update and JNI allocation suggestions.
Source: reviewer backends gpt-5.6-sol (general, security-auditor, rust-quality, ffi-engineer); final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)
1 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:691-700: Do not expire unresolved holds by sweep observation age
`held_since_height` records when the sweep was observed, not the block height where its winner was mined. The pinned wallet emits `TransactionsSwept` from the mempool path when an InstantSend-locked winner arrives, and InstantSend finality does not require that transaction to be mined within the next two blocks. Unrelated blocks and chainlocks can therefore advance `min(chainlock_height, synced_height)` past this cutoff while the winner remains unmined, deleting the only durable hold for a funding output that has not materialized yet. After a restart, a later funding-output delivery is inserted as unspent because neither the tombstone nor an irrelevant winner record remains to preserve the spend. The upstream `prune_finalized_observed_spends` logic is not analogous: it stores the actual height of an on-chain spend and prunes only when that specific height is inside the finality boundary. Swift and Kotlin apply the same observation-age rule and are weaker still: they only require that some chainlock bytes exist, then use `syncedHeight` without checking the current numeric chainlock height. Preserve the claim until persistence has evidence tying this winner to a finalized block height, and add a restart regression where the InstantSend winner remains unmined while the funding output arrives after the current collection margin.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/balance_handler.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/balance_handler.rs:75-80: Do not discard a contended sweep balance snapshot
`TransactionsSwept` can be the only event carrying the corrected lower balance, particularly when an irrelevant final winner consumes a wallet input and emits no later wallet-relevant record. If a wallet insertion, removal, or load operation briefly holds the wallets-map write lock, `try_read()` permanently drops that snapshot. The event bus neither retries nor coalesces updates, so the public lock-free balance can continue displaying funds the underlying wallet removed until an unrelated balance-bearing event arrives. Use an ordered retry/coalescing path or another wallet lookup mechanism that cannot lose the latest snapshot.
In `packages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rs:696-702: Allocate the sweep winner byte array once per batch
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3812592062)
`SweepBatchFFI::superseded_by` is invariant across the batch, but this loop allocates and copies the same 32-byte Java array once per loser. The loser count is network-influenced, and this projection runs synchronously inside the atomic persistence callback. The surrounding batch-local JNI frame can own one shared read-only array and reuse it in every `winners` slot.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The ordered, capability-negotiated sweep persistence seam remains substantially hardened, but its age-based tombstone collector can still delete a genuine unresolved spend claim before the InstantSend winner is mined, allowing a consumed output to return as spendable after restart. The carried-forward balance snapshot loss and redundant JNI allocation also remain valid, while the payment-flip coupling was explicitly extracted from this PR at the exact head and is therefore not an in-scope blocker here.
Source: Codex reviewers gpt-5.6-sol (general, security-auditor, rust-quality, FFI engineer); final verifier gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)
1 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
2 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/balance_handler.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/balance_handler.rs:75-80: Do not discard a contended sweep balance snapshot
`TransactionsSwept` can be the only event carrying the corrected lower balance, particularly when an irrelevant final winner consumes a wallet input and emits no later wallet-relevant record. If a wallet lifecycle operation briefly holds the wallets-map write lock, `try_read()` drops that snapshot permanently. The event bus neither retries nor coalesces balance updates, so the public lock-free balance can continue displaying funds the underlying wallet removed until an unrelated balance-bearing event arrives. Use an ordered retry/coalescing path or another wallet lookup mechanism that guarantees eventual delivery of the latest snapshot.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:691-700: Do not expire unresolved holds by sweep observation age
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3823666903)
`held_since_height` records when the sweep was observed, not when its winner was mined. The pinned wallet emits `TransactionsSwept` from `process_mempool_transaction` when an InstantSend-locked winner arrives, and `drop_conflicted_transactions` explicitly treats InstantSend as settled without requiring block inclusion. Unrelated blocks and chainlocks can therefore advance `min(chainlock_height, synced_height)` past this two-block cutoff while the winner remains unmined, deleting the only durable claim for a funding output that has not materialized yet. After restart, a later funding-output delivery can insert that consumed output as unspent because neither the tombstone nor an irrelevant winner record remains. This is not equivalent to upstream `prune_finalized_observed_spends`, which stores the actual block height of each observed on-chain spend and prunes only when that specific height is within the finality boundary. Swift and Kotlin apply the same observation-age rule with weaker evidence, using synced height after merely observing some chainlock bytes. Retain the claim until persistence has evidence tying this winner to a finalized block height.
In `packages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rs:696-702: Allocate the sweep winner byte array once per batch
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3812592062)
`SweepBatchFFI::superseded_by` is invariant across every loser in the batch, but this loop allocates and copies the same 32-byte Java array once per txid. The loser count is network-influenced, and the projection runs synchronously inside the atomic persistence callback. The enclosing batch-local JNI frame can own one shared read-only array and reuse it in every `winners` slot; the in-tree Kotlin handler does not mutate these arrays.
…arsing) Pin fix/mnemonic-any-language-173ffac: the cherry-pick of dashpay/rust-dashcore#980 onto 173ffac0, the rev v4.2-dev already pins. This lands the BIP-39 fix without crossing the breaking key-wallet sweep changes (rust-dashcore #961/#962/#966/#969) that #4406 adapts platform to; once #4406 bumps onto rust-dashcore dev proper, the pin rejoins dev and this branch can be deleted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…per loser `superseded_by` is invariant for a batch, but the projection allocated a fresh 32-byte Java array for every loser. The loser count is network-influenced and this runs synchronously inside the atomic persistence callback, so it is work an attacker can scale. `new_object_array` fills every slot with its initial element, so the winner is now allocated once and the per-loser set disappears with it — the loop only projects txids. Sharing one array is safe because the Kotlin consumer only reads these values: `supersededBy[i]` feeds DAO arguments and entity fields, and nothing writes into the array.
…writes BalanceUpdateHandler::on_wallet_event is synchronous and looked wallets up with try_read() on the tokio RwLock wallets map, dropping the event's balance snapshot whenever a manager lifecycle write (create / remove / load) was in flight. The bus neither retries nor coalesces, and TransactionsSwept can be the only event carrying the corrected lower balance - the winner that settled the inputs need not be wallet-relevant - so one lost sweep leaves removed funds on display until an unrelated balance-bearing event happens to arrive. Convert the map to arc_swap::ArcSwap (already this crate's idiom for rare-write / hot-read state): readers take a wait-free snapshot that can never fail or block, so the drop window no longer exists rather than being papered over; the rare lifecycle writers publish via rcu, preserving the generation-checked removal's check-and-remove atomicity. The sync-context accessors that used blocking_read() become wait-free loads as a side effect, removing their panic-inside-runtime hazard. The regression test parks a lifecycle writer mid-rcu and asserts a sweep snapshot delivered in that window is observable immediately. The pre-fix form of the same test - holding wallets.write() across the delivery - was run against the old code first and failed with the balance atomics stuck at the stale value.
…ashcore-dev-961 Two conflicts, both about the rust-dashcore pin, plus one semantic break the textual merge hid. `v4.2-dev` pinned `a97b32c6` in #4455, which turns out to be a side branch off the old `173ffac0` carrying cherry-picks of the seed refresh and the BIP-39 fix. This branch pinned `5877d15f`, on `dev`'s mainline. Neither contains the other. Resolved onto `dev`'s head `b66db390`, which is a superset of both: it carries the seed refresh (#970) and the BIP-39 fix (#980) that `v4.2-dev` wanted, plus #966 and #969 that this branch needs, plus the QRInfo masternode-sync recovery (#947). The hidden break: `v4.2-dev` added `get_wallet_blocking`, which calls `blocking_read()` on the wallets map — a method this branch removed when the map became an `ArcSwap`. Git merged the file cleanly and the build failed. The accessor now loads wait-free; its name is kept so the FFI callers that predate the change still compile.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The balance-snapshot and JNI winner-allocation fixes are correct, and the ordered, capability-negotiated sweep persistence path is otherwise well structured. One blocking durability defect remains: unresolved spend claims are expired by elapsed height even though the specific InstantSend winner may still be unmined, allowing a consumed output to return as spendable after restart. Source: Codex reviewer backends (general, security-auditor, rust-quality, FFI engineer): gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend: gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:691-700: Do not expire unresolved holds by sweep observation age
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3823666903)
`held_since_height` is the height at which the sweep was observed, not the block height at which its winner was mined. The pinned wallet invokes conflict sweeping for an InstantSend-locked transaction in the mempool path and emits `TransactionsSwept` before requiring block inclusion. Unrelated blocks can therefore advance `min(chainlock_height, synced_height)` two heights beyond the observation stamp while that winner remains unmined, causing this DELETE to remove the only durable claim for an as-yet-unmaterialized funding output. If the winner is wallet-irrelevant, no persisted winner record can restore that claim; after restart, later delivery of the funding output can insert the consumed coin as unspent. This is not equivalent to upstream `prune_finalized_observed_spends`: upstream stores the actual block height of each specific on-chain spend and prunes only after that height is within the finality boundary. Swift and Kotlin implement the same unsafe observation-age policy using synced height after only establishing that some chainlock bytes exist. Retain unresolved claims until persistence has evidence tying the specific winner to a finalized block height, or retain them indefinitely when that evidence is unavailable.
…ned height Repin rust-dashcore to 090faea2 (#975), which adds winner_mined_height to WalletEvent::TransactionsSwept, and rework the sweep-tombstone lifetime rule on all three backends to mirror key-wallet's observed-spends doctrine exactly, closing the held_since_height review blocker: - a mempool-context sweep (IS-locked winner, unmined) creates no placeholder at all: upstream deliberately never records an unconfirmed spend ("an unconfirmed spend must not invalidate a coin"), the engine keeps no durable hold the mirror could be mirroring, and the placeholder population an attacker could grow by double-spending incoming payments dies at the source - a block-context placeholder stores the winner's own mined height and is collected exactly when min(chainlock_height, synced_height) reaches it - prune_finalized_observed_spends' condition verbatim; the two-block observation-age margin, the held_since_height stamp, and the back-fill machinery are removed, not bypassed - an IS-locked chained re-point keeps the earlier block-context stamp, as upstream never retracts an observed-spend entry for an unconfirmed conflict; a block-context re-point re-stamps to the new winner's height - SweepBatchFFI carries the winner's finality context, and the numeric chainlock height now crosses to mobile through a new size-negotiated extension slot, replacing the "chainlock bytes exist" gate that let Swift and Kotlin collect on synced height alone SQLite V006 and Room's v12->13 migration are amended in place under the pre-release policy (nothing shipped has applied either); a dev database that ran the old V006 fails refinery's divergence check and must be recreated.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The observation-age collector is gone, but the replacement now drops the only durable claim for an unresolved input when the sweep winner is InstantSend-locked and unmined, allowing the consumed coin to return as spendable after restart. The ordered merge path is otherwise substantially hardened, with one documentation correction needed because sweep-aware merging is deliberately non-commutative.
Source: Codex reviewer backends (general, security-auditor, rust-quality, FFI engineer): gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend: gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)
1 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:460-469: Preserve unresolved holds for unmined InstantSend winners
This branch discards a non-released input when the funding TXO has not materialized and the sweep winner is InstantSend-locked but unmined. Upstream treats that winner as settled under DIP-10: `drop_conflicted_transactions` removes the loser, excludes the winner's shared inputs from the released set, and retains those inputs in the account's `spent_outpoints`. Platform restoration does not persist that internal set, however, and an irrelevant winner can produce no transaction record. After restart, neither the deleted loser nor a winner record reconstructs the claim, so a later funding-output delivery is inserted as unspent; the new regression test explicitly asserts that incorrect credit. This also contradicts `CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL`, whose contract requires every non-released input to retain a durable spend claim even before its funding TXO materializes. Preserve an unstamped tombstone for this case, or carry an authoritative ownership/hold signal that permits durable retention without creating placeholders for foreign inputs.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:82-85: Do not describe the ordered changeset merge as commutative
The comment says `CoreChangeSet` merging is commutative, but sweep-aware merging intentionally depends on operand order: incoming records retract earlier sweeps, while sweep batches append in emission order so later decisions override earlier ones. Reversing or parallelizing the fold can therefore persist a different spend decision. State the ordered, associative contract directly so future callers do not treat reordering as safe.
| if affected == 0 && !freed { | ||
| // No row to hold and nothing durable to key a hold on: an | ||
| // IS-locked winner (`winner_mined_height` None) gets no | ||
| // placeholder — upstream records nothing for an unconfirmed | ||
| // spend, and this is where the foreign-input junk an attacker | ||
| // could grow by double-spending incoming payments is killed at | ||
| // the source rather than aged out. | ||
| let Some(height) = winner_mined_height else { | ||
| continue; | ||
| }; |
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🔴 Blocking: Preserve unresolved holds for unmined InstantSend winners
This branch discards a non-released input when the funding TXO has not materialized and the sweep winner is InstantSend-locked but unmined. Upstream treats that winner as settled under DIP-10: drop_conflicted_transactions removes the loser, excludes the winner's shared inputs from the released set, and retains those inputs in the account's spent_outpoints. Platform restoration does not persist that internal set, however, and an irrelevant winner can produce no transaction record. After restart, neither the deleted loser nor a winner record reconstructs the claim, so a later funding-output delivery is inserted as unspent; the new regression test explicitly asserts that incorrect credit. This also contradicts CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL, whose contract requires every non-released input to retain a durable spend claim even before its funding TXO materializes. Preserve an unstamped tombstone for this case, or carry an authoritative ownership/hold signal that permits durable retention without creating placeholders for foreign inputs.
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in this update — Preserve unresolved holds for unmined InstantSend winners no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
…ashcore-dev-961 Brings in five commits; #4465 (wallet-independent tracked masternodes) collides with this branch's persistence-capability and persistence- extension surfaces. Seven files conflicted, and two more collisions arrived textually clean and had to be resolved by hand. Capability-bit collision: v4.2-dev's TRACKED_MASTERNODES and this branch's CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL both claimed bit 10 (0x400) — the auto-merge even left both `1 << 10` constants in the file without a conflict marker. The file's contract makes v1 bit meanings append-only (existing values are never renumbered or reused), and TRACKED_MASTERNODES is already merged on the mainline, so its assignment is the published one; this branch's unmerged bits are the ones that move: CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL 1<<10 → 1<<11 (0x800), DASHPAY_PAYMENTS 1<<11 → 1<<12 (0x1000). Mirrored across the FFI C constants, the Swift and Kotlin declarations (Kotlin also gains a TRACKED_MASTERNODES mirror constant, unattested on Android), the v1 stability pins (Kotlin handler pin 0x7bf → 0xbbf), the KNOWN names table (now naming all three bits), and the name-coverage loop bound (0..13). Renumbering is safe because the bits are negotiated at runtime between Rust and the host inside one app binary and are never persisted: no schema column, no serialized model, no defaults store records them anywhere. Persistence-extension slot ordering: both sides appended to the size-negotiated PersistenceCallbacksExtension after the DPNS slot — mainline the tracked-masternode trio, this branch the sweeps and chainlock-height slots. Slot order is the ABI under version 1 and mainline's trio is the published layout, so the merged order is dpns → persist/load/free tracked masternodes → sweeps → chainlock height. The layout test now pins the full offset-adjacency chain, and the negotiation test walks every historical struct_size boundary (DPNS-era, masternode-era, sweeps-era, current). The per-slot reader fns were merged into mainline's single persistence_extension_callbacks() shape, implemented on this branch's negotiated_extension_slot! gate, and FFIPersister keeps both constructor families with new_with_persistence_capabilities_and_extensions as the base. Migration collision (textually clean, semantically fatal): both sides added a V006 refinery migration. Mainline's V006__tracked_masternodes is merged and keeps the number; this branch's V006__utxo_sweep_winner_height is renumbered to V007. Pre-release dev databases that applied the old V006 hit refinery's divergence check and must be recreated (the same policy V001's test documents). sqlite/persister.rs, PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift and InvitationPersistenceTests.swift resolve as unions: both stores genuinely implement both features, so they attest all three bits and wire all six extension slots. Not lost, relocated: #4465 moved ten provider-tx aggregation tests from ffi/core_wallet_types.rs into platform-wallet/src/masternode/record.rs; the merge follows the move. One textually-clean semantic break fixed in PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift: mainline's persistTrackedMasternodes staged rows on the shared round context and, with a changeset round open, returned success while deferring the save to endChangeset. That was benign on mainline, but this branch gave endChangeset a new rollback trigger (an unresolvable DashPay deferred-payment owner calls rollback()) and widened the round window across the sweeps extension callback — so an unrelated round failure could silently revert a registry write Rust was already told succeeded, resurrecting an untracked masternode with nothing to re-issue the removal. The persist now runs on its own dedicated ModelContext and saves before returning, honouring the Rust contract that registry writes are not round-scoped. The sweep-tombstone GC logic is untouched.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The ordered, capability-negotiated sweep persistence seam is substantially hardened, but it still discards the only durable spend claim for an unresolved input consumed by an unmined InstantSend winner, allowing the coin to return as spendable after restart. Two comments also misstate the public contracts: the event fold is order-sensitive rather than commutative, and Kotlin describes physical deletion where durable exclusion and claim retention are required.
Source: Codex reviewer backends gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 2 suggestion(s)
1 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/changeset/core_bridge.rs:82-85: Do not describe the ordered changeset merge as commutative
The comment calls `CoreChangeSet` merging commutative, but the implementation is intentionally order-sensitive. Records from the incoming operand retract matching sweeps already accumulated on the left, and sweep batches append in emission order so a later decision can override an earlier release. Reversing operands or using an unordered parallel reduction can therefore produce different persisted transaction and spend decisions. Document that callers must preserve wallet-event arrival order.
In `packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/wallet/PlatformWalletManager.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/wallet/PlatformWalletManager.kt:72-77: Align Kotlin's sweep capability contract with retained claims
This public Kotlin mirror says the loser and any tombstoned pending-input claim physically leave Room. That contradicts the capability semantics defined in Rust and implemented by the mobile handler: swept rows may remain inert while other wallets finish scoped cleanup, and a non-released unresolved input must retain a detached tombstone so its later funding delivery cannot appear unspent. Out-of-tree Android persistence implementations can use this KDoc as their contract, so describe observable exclusion, release, and claim-retention behavior rather than requiring physical deletion.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:460-469: Preserve unresolved holds for unmined InstantSend winners
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3844758655)
When a non-released loser input has no materialized UTXO row, this branch deliberately creates no tombstone if the winner is InstantSend-locked but unmined. The pinned rust-dashcore implementation nevertheless treats that winner as settled under DIP-10: it removes the loser, excludes the winner's shared inputs from `released_outpoints`, and retains those inputs in the live account's `spent_outpoints`. That private set is rebuilt from surviving transaction records during restoration; an irrelevant winner has no record, and the loser has just been deleted, so Platform restores no equivalent claim. A later funding-output delivery is consequently inserted as unspent after restart, as `a_funding_output_arriving_after_a_mempool_sweep_and_restart_lands_unspent` explicitly demonstrates. Swift and Kotlin apply the same policy by deleting unresolved pending rows when the winner height is absent. Preserve an unstamped durable hold for this case, or extend the event with authoritative ownership information that permits retaining genuine wallet claims without persisting foreign-input placeholders.
| * A stored core changeset's swept transactions are durably removed: | ||
| * the loser's row (and any tombstoned pending-input claim standing | ||
| * in for a not-yet-materialized UTXO) actually leaves Room. Mirrors | ||
| * `PersistenceCapabilities::CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL`. | ||
| */ | ||
| const val CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL: Long = 1L shl 11 |
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🟡 Suggestion: Align Kotlin's sweep capability contract with retained claims
This public Kotlin mirror says the loser and any tombstoned pending-input claim physically leave Room. That contradicts the capability semantics defined in Rust and implemented by the mobile handler: swept rows may remain inert while other wallets finish scoped cleanup, and a non-released unresolved input must retain a detached tombstone so its later funding delivery cannot appear unspent. Out-of-tree Android persistence implementations can use this KDoc as their contract, so describe observable exclusion, release, and claim-retention behavior rather than requiring physical deletion.
| * A stored core changeset's swept transactions are durably removed: | |
| * the loser's row (and any tombstoned pending-input claim standing | |
| * in for a not-yet-materialized UTXO) actually leaves Room. Mirrors | |
| * `PersistenceCapabilities::CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL`. | |
| */ | |
| const val CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL: Long = 1L shl 11 | |
| /** | |
| * A stored core changeset's sweep batches are durably applied in order: | |
| * swept transactions and outputs are excluded from restoration, released | |
| * outpoints are freed unless superseded, and non-released spend claims | |
| * remain durable even when their funding TXO has not materialized. | |
| * Mirrors `PersistenceCapabilities::CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL`. | |
| */ |
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in 4a02bf8 — Align Kotlin's sweep capability contract with retained claims no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
…text sweeps An IS-locked, unmined winner's sweep previously created no placeholder for a held-but-unfunded input, so the only durable spend claim vanished with the loser: after a restart, a late funding-output delivery landed freshly unspent although the network had provably consumed the coin (DIP-10 settles the input the moment the winner is locked). Upstream retains exactly this hold in the account's spent_outpoints after drop_conflicted_transactions - but that set is serde(skip_serializing) and rebuilt from live records on load, and after the sweep neither the deleted loser nor a possibly wallet-irrelevant winner leaves a record to rebuild it from. The mirror's tombstone is the hold's only durable carrier, and CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL's contract already required it: every non-released input retains a durable spend claim even before its funding TXO materializes. All three backends (SQLite, Swift, Kotlin) now write the tombstone in EVERY sweep context and key only its lifetime on the winner's finality: - block context stamps the winner's mined height and collects at the chainlock finality boundary, unchanged - mempool context leaves the stamp NULL, and the collector never touches an unstamped row - an IS-locked winner has no mining deadline, and the funding tx of an input it spends may itself be IS-locked and unmined, so no watermark can prove the funding delivered-or-never; collecting early is exactly the unsound deletion the previous review rejected - an unstamped hold resolves only through proof: the funding upsert materializes it (wallet-owned claims always eventually deliver via BIP158), a later block-context sweep re-stamps it into the collectible set, or a release deletes it The permanent residue is foreign inputs of IS-context sweeps, which no ownership signal can gate (dashpay/rust-dashcore#968: input_details is computed from the record-time UTXO snapshot and is empty by construction for an unmaterialized funding TXO; upstream's spent_outpoints holds foreign inputs too). It is bounded by attack cost rather than collection: masternodes lock first-seen, so each row requires a conflicting payment delivered straight to the victim while withheld from the network, plus a fee-paying network-accepted IS-locked double-spend. Unlike the rejected unconditional-placeholder design, block-context rows - the shape an ordinary double-spend reaches - still collect. The regression tests that asserted the post-restart credit encoded the wrong expectation and are inverted; a new test per backend covers the block-context re-stamp channel. No schema changes: the stamp columns were already nullable and every collector already skipped NULL.
…erge contract The Merge module doc and the adapter's batching comment both described CoreChangeSet merging as commutative and safe to reorder. It is neither: merging is an ordered left fold in production order, associative but not commutative. A record in the later operand retracts an earlier sweep of the same txid (reinstatement) while the reverse order keeps the sweep for apply time to honor, sweep batches append in emission order so a later batch's spend decision replays over an earlier release, and the IS-lock map's last-write-wins plus the chain-lock equal-height tie-break also take the later operand. Reversing or parallelizing the fold can therefore persist a different spend decision, not just a differently-arranged changeset. Regrouping the fold remains safe - associativity is what the batching adapter actually relies on. Comments only; no behavior change.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The exact head correctly preserves unstamped mempool-context holds and documents the ordered, non-commutative merge, but the pinned rust-dashcore sweep can still release a coin consumed by a pruned finalized transaction and restore it as spendable. The remaining in-scope non-blockers are the foreign-input tombstone amplification path and two stale persistence-contract comments. Source: Codex reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol; openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 2 suggestion(s)
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `Cargo.toml`:
- [BLOCKING] Cargo.toml:56-61: Do not release coins spent by pruned finalized transactions
The pinned key-wallet implementation computes each sweep's released outpoints from the removed losers and protects an outpoint only when a surviving full transaction record still claims it. With the default `keep-finalized-transactions` feature disabled, a chainlocked transaction is reduced to its txid, so its inputs are absent from that survivor set; the pinned `WalletEvent::TransactionsSwept` documentation explicitly records this limitation. A wallet-relevant transaction L can therefore arrive after finalized transaction F was pruned, include an output paying this wallet, and reuse both an outpoint already consumed by F and an attacker-owned input. If final transaction W later conflicts with L on the attacker-owned input, sweeping L reports F's input as released even though it remains spent on-chain. All persistence backends trust that release; SQLite sets the materialized UTXO to `spent = 0`, so after restart it is restored as spendable and coin selection can construct a guaranteed double spend. Preserve settled-input attribution after record pruning, retain the full finalized records, or repin to an upstream implementation that tracks which transaction established each spent mark.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:483-496: Bound foreign-input tombstones for unmined InstantSend sweeps
This branch creates an unstamped, permanently retained wallet row for every absent non-released input of an unmined InstantSend sweep, even though the raw loser input does not prove wallet ownership. A transaction can be wallet-relevant only because it pays a wallet output while all inputs belong to the sender; a directly delivered, withheld loser followed by a fee-paying IS-locked replacement therefore leaves one permanent placeholder per foreign input. Repeating that sequence grows wallet-scoped storage and the work of restoration and persistence scans. The same lifetime exists in the mobile tombstone stores. A local filter based on current `input_details` or UTXOs would be unsafe because it would also discard genuine spend-before-funding holds, so the durable event needs an authoritative per-wallet ownership or held-outpoint signal from upstream before placeholder creation can be restricted.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/migrations/V007__utxo_sweep_winner_height.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/migrations/V007__utxo_sweep_winner_height.rs:8-18: Update the migration contract for unstamped mempool tombstones
This migration still says only block-context sweeps create placeholders, unmined InstantSend winners create none, and current code never writes a NULL winner height. The current `apply_sweep` intentionally does the opposite: every unresolved non-released input gets a placeholder, while an unmined InstantSend winner stores `winner_mined_height = NULL` so the collector retains the hold indefinitely. This is the long-lived explanation for the nullable column and currently directs maintainers toward the restart bug fixed by `1505912fbc`.
In `packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/wallet/PlatformWalletManager.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/wallet/PlatformWalletManager.kt:72-77: Align Kotlin's sweep capability contract with retained claims
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3845648636)
This public Kotlin mirror still promises physical deletion of the loser and its pending-input tombstone. The Rust capability and Android implementation instead require observable exclusion while allowing a globally swept transaction row to remain inert during wallet-scoped cleanup, and they deliberately retain a detached non-released claim when its funding TXO has not materialized. An out-of-tree Android persister following this KDoc could delete the only durable cross-restart hold and later restore the consumed funding output as spendable. Define the capability in terms of ordered exclusion, authoritative releases, and retained spend claims rather than physical row deletion.
| dashcore = { git = "https://github.com/dashpay/rust-dashcore", rev = "090faea22494b2b9d6d3995e78f87b8e2a3bd5be" } | ||
| dash-network-seeds = { git = "https://github.com/dashpay/rust-dashcore", rev = "090faea22494b2b9d6d3995e78f87b8e2a3bd5be" } | ||
| dash-spv = { git = "https://github.com/dashpay/rust-dashcore", rev = "090faea22494b2b9d6d3995e78f87b8e2a3bd5be" } | ||
| key-wallet = { git = "https://github.com/dashpay/rust-dashcore", rev = "090faea22494b2b9d6d3995e78f87b8e2a3bd5be" } | ||
| key-wallet-ffi = { git = "https://github.com/dashpay/rust-dashcore", rev = "090faea22494b2b9d6d3995e78f87b8e2a3bd5be" } | ||
| key-wallet-manager = { git = "https://github.com/dashpay/rust-dashcore", rev = "090faea22494b2b9d6d3995e78f87b8e2a3bd5be" } |
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🔴 Blocking: Do not release coins spent by pruned finalized transactions
The pinned key-wallet implementation computes each sweep's released outpoints from the removed losers and protects an outpoint only when a surviving full transaction record still claims it. With the default keep-finalized-transactions feature disabled, a chainlocked transaction is reduced to its txid, so its inputs are absent from that survivor set; the pinned WalletEvent::TransactionsSwept documentation explicitly records this limitation. A wallet-relevant transaction L can therefore arrive after finalized transaction F was pruned, include an output paying this wallet, and reuse both an outpoint already consumed by F and an attacker-owned input. If final transaction W later conflicts with L on the attacker-owned input, sweeping L reports F's input as released even though it remains spent on-chain. All persistence backends trust that release; SQLite sets the materialized UTXO to spent = 0, so after restart it is restored as spendable and coin selection can construct a guaranteed double spend. Preserve settled-input attribution after record pruning, retain the full finalized records, or repin to an upstream implementation that tracks which transaction established each spent mark.
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in this update — Do not release coins spent by pruned finalized transactions no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
| if affected == 0 && !freed { | ||
| // A held input with no row gets a placeholder in EVERY sweep | ||
| // context — `CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL`'s contract: each non-released | ||
| // input retains a durable spend claim even when its funding | ||
| // TXO has not materialised yet. An IS-locked, unmined winner | ||
| // just leaves the stamp NULL, which the collector never | ||
| // touches — see the doc comment above for what resolves (and | ||
| // what bounds) an unstamped row. | ||
| tombstone_stmt.execute(params![ | ||
| wallet_id.as_slice(), | ||
| &key[..], | ||
| AsRef::<[u8]>::as_ref(superseded_by), | ||
| winner_mined_height.map(i64::from) | ||
| ])?; |
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🟡 Suggestion: Bound foreign-input tombstones for unmined InstantSend sweeps
This branch creates an unstamped, permanently retained wallet row for every absent non-released input of an unmined InstantSend sweep, even though the raw loser input does not prove wallet ownership. A transaction can be wallet-relevant only because it pays a wallet output while all inputs belong to the sender; a directly delivered, withheld loser followed by a fee-paying IS-locked replacement therefore leaves one permanent placeholder per foreign input. Repeating that sequence grows wallet-scoped storage and the work of restoration and persistence scans. The same lifetime exists in the mobile tombstone stores. A local filter based on current input_details or UTXOs would be unsafe because it would also discard genuine spend-before-funding holds, so the durable event needs an authoritative per-wallet ownership or held-outpoint signal from upstream before placeholder creation can be restricted.
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in this update — Bound foreign-input tombstones for unmined InstantSend sweeps no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
| //! no other writer leaves `height` NULL). The height is carried on the | ||
| //! sweep event itself (`TransactionsSwept::winner_mined_height`), and | ||
| //! only a block-context sweep — one whose winner actually mined — writes | ||
| //! a tombstone at all; an InstantSend-locked winner has no mining | ||
| //! deadline and leaves no placeholder, mirroring key-wallet's | ||
| //! `observed_spent_outpoints` doctrine ("an unconfirmed spend must not | ||
| //! invalidate a coin"). The collector in `core_state::apply` evicts a | ||
| //! tombstone exactly when `min(chainlock_height, synced_height)` reaches | ||
| //! its winner's height — `prune_finalized_observed_spends`' condition | ||
| //! verbatim, with no observation-age margin. NULL is never written by | ||
| //! current code; an unstamped held row is held forever rather than |
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🟡 Suggestion: Update the migration contract for unstamped mempool tombstones
This migration still says only block-context sweeps create placeholders, unmined InstantSend winners create none, and current code never writes a NULL winner height. The current apply_sweep intentionally does the opposite: every unresolved non-released input gets a placeholder, while an unmined InstantSend winner stores winner_mined_height = NULL so the collector retains the hold indefinitely. This is the long-lived explanation for the nullable column and currently directs maintainers toward the restart bug fixed by 1505912fbc.
| //! no other writer leaves `height` NULL). The height is carried on the | |
| //! sweep event itself (`TransactionsSwept::winner_mined_height`), and | |
| //! only a block-context sweep — one whose winner actually mined — writes | |
| //! a tombstone at all; an InstantSend-locked winner has no mining | |
| //! deadline and leaves no placeholder, mirroring key-wallet's | |
| //! `observed_spent_outpoints` doctrine ("an unconfirmed spend must not | |
| //! invalidate a coin"). The collector in `core_state::apply` evicts a | |
| //! tombstone exactly when `min(chainlock_height, synced_height)` reaches | |
| //! its winner's height — `prune_finalized_observed_spends`' condition | |
| //! verbatim, with no observation-age margin. NULL is never written by | |
| //! current code; an unstamped held row is held forever rather than | |
| //! sweep event itself (`TransactionsSwept::winner_mined_height`). Every | |
| //! sweep context writes a tombstone for a held input whose funding output | |
| //! is absent. A block-context sweep stamps the winner's mined height, and | |
| //! the collector evicts that row when `min(chainlock_height, | |
| //! synced_height)` reaches the stamp — `prune_finalized_observed_spends`' | |
| //! condition verbatim. An InstantSend-locked, unmined winner instead | |
| //! writes NULL: it has no mining deadline, so the resulting unstamped hold | |
| //! is never collected by a height watermark and remains until funding | |
| //! materialisation, a later block-context re-stamp, or an explicit release. |
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in a76bc79 — Update the migration contract for unstamped mempool tombstones no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
… mempool tombstones The migration's module doc still described the pre-1505912fbc design: placeholders only from block-context sweeps, no placeholder for an IS-locked winner, and "NULL is never written by current code". The current apply_sweep does the opposite - every non-released held input gets a placeholder in every sweep context, and a mempool-context sweep leaves winner_mined_height NULL on purpose, an unstamped row the collector never takes. As the long-lived explanation for the nullable column, the doc was pointing maintainers straight at the restart bug 1505912 fixed.
… row deletion The KDoc still promised physical deletion of the loser's row and its pending-input tombstone. The Rust capability contract requires observable exclusion from every restore and enumeration path, tolerates an inert globally-swept row until wallet-scoped cleanup lands, and deliberately retains a detached non-released spend claim whose funding TXO has not materialized - that tombstone is the only durable cross-restart hold, and an out-of-tree Android persister following the old wording would delete it and later credit a coin the network already consumed. Rewritten in the Rust doc's terms; the Swift mirror already states the contract correctly.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The ordered, capability-negotiated sweep persistence path is extensively tested, and the latest Kotlin capability and SQLite migration documentation fixes are correct. One blocking wallet-integrity defect remains in the pinned rust-dashcore release calculation, and the public JNI callback documentation still states the opposite of the implemented unstamped-tombstone contract.
Source: Codex reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/ffi/NativePersistenceBridge.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/ffi/NativePersistenceBridge.kt:310-322: Document the ordered batch and unstamped-hold JNI contract
This public callback contract contradicts both sides of the implementation. JNI invokes the method once per `SweepBatchFFI`, potentially multiple times in one changeset round and in emission order, rather than once for the whole round. It also says `winnerMinedHeight == -1` means no tombstone, while the in-tree Kotlin handler deliberately maps `-1` to a null height and retains every unresolved non-released input as a durable, unstamped tombstone that no height watermark may collect. An out-of-tree persister following the current KDoc can collapse non-commutative batches or discard the only cross-restart hold while still declaring `CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL`. The matching comments in `packages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rs:728-733` and `PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift:1171-1179` repeat the obsolete no-tombstone rule and should be aligned with this contract.
In `Cargo.toml`:
- [BLOCKING] Cargo.toml:56-61: Do not release coins spent by pruned finalized transactions
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3846162023)
The workspace remains pinned to rust-dashcore `090faea22494b2b9d6d3995e78f87b8e2a3bd5be`, and production does not enable `keep-finalized-transactions`. At that revision, `release_spent_marks` protects release candidates using inputs reconstructed from surviving full transaction records, while `WalletEvent::TransactionsSwept` explicitly documents that a chainlocked transaction is normally reduced to its txid and its inputs disappear from that calculation. A later wallet-relevant loser can reuse an outpoint already consumed by the pruned finalized transaction plus another input; when the loser is swept because of the other input, the already-consumed outpoint is incorrectly reported as released. Every persistence backend treats that set as authoritative. SQLite, for example, sets the materialized UTXO to `spent = 0` and clears `spent_in_txid`, so after restart the wallet can display nonexistent funds and select an output whose attempted spend is guaranteed to conflict with the finalized transaction. Preserve settled-input attribution after record pruning, enable full finalized-record retention in production, or repin to an upstream implementation that associates each spent mark with the transaction that established it.
| /** | ||
| * Transactions the wallet removed this round, as raw 32-byte txids, | ||
| * each paired by index with the transaction that settled its inputs, | ||
| * plus the outpoints the removals actually freed. Fired once after the | ||
| * per-account decomposition, and only when the round swept something. | ||
| * Descriptor `([B[[B[[B[[BI)I`. | ||
| * | ||
| * [winnerMinedHeight] is the winner's own mined block height for a | ||
| * block-context sweep, or -1 for an InstantSend-locked winner not yet | ||
| * mined (the sentinel is unambiguous — block heights are | ||
| * non-negative — and the handler maps it back to null). It keys the | ||
| * whole lifetime rule of a pending-input tombstone: no height, no | ||
| * tombstone. |
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🟡 Suggestion: Document the ordered batch and unstamped-hold JNI contract
This public callback contract contradicts both sides of the implementation. JNI invokes the method once per SweepBatchFFI, potentially multiple times in one changeset round and in emission order, rather than once for the whole round. It also says winnerMinedHeight == -1 means no tombstone, while the in-tree Kotlin handler deliberately maps -1 to a null height and retains every unresolved non-released input as a durable, unstamped tombstone that no height watermark may collect. An out-of-tree persister following the current KDoc can collapse non-commutative batches or discard the only cross-restart hold while still declaring CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL. The matching comments in packages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rs:728-733 and PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift:1171-1179 repeat the obsolete no-tombstone rule and should be aligned with this contract.
| /** | |
| * Transactions the wallet removed this round, as raw 32-byte txids, | |
| * each paired by index with the transaction that settled its inputs, | |
| * plus the outpoints the removals actually freed. Fired once after the | |
| * per-account decomposition, and only when the round swept something. | |
| * Descriptor `([B[[B[[B[[BI)I`. | |
| * | |
| * [winnerMinedHeight] is the winner's own mined block height for a | |
| * block-context sweep, or -1 for an InstantSend-locked winner not yet | |
| * mined (the sentinel is unambiguous — block heights are | |
| * non-negative — and the handler maps it back to null). It keys the | |
| * whole lifetime rule of a pending-input tombstone: no height, no | |
| * tombstone. | |
| /** | |
| * One ordered sweep batch: raw 32-byte loser txids, each paired by | |
| * index with the transaction that settled its inputs, plus the outpoints | |
| * this batch actually freed. Native may invoke this method multiple times | |
| * in one changeset round; implementations must apply every invocation in | |
| * call order because a later batch can retain an outpoint an earlier batch | |
| * released. Descriptor `([B[[B[[B[[BI)I`. | |
| * | |
| * [winnerMinedHeight] is the winner's own mined block height for a | |
| * block-context sweep, or -1 for an InstantSend-locked winner not yet | |
| * mined. A -1 winner still requires every non-released unresolved claim | |
| * to remain durable, but the tombstone remains unstamped and no | |
| * height-based collector may remove it. |
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in 4fee0e8 — Document the ordered batch and unstamped-hold JNI contract no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
…led record still claims Upstream computes TransactionsSwept::released_outpoints from its live records, and under the default keep-finalized-transactions=off a chainlocked spender is pruned to a bare txid - the pinned event doc records the limitation outright: the inputs of a pruned record survive nowhere else, so it cannot be resolved at that layer. A wallet-relevant loser recorded after the pruning can reuse the pruned spender's input alongside an attacker-owned one; when a final winner beats it on the attacker input alone, the sweep names the settled coin released, every backend flips its materialized UTXO back to spendable, and the next load hands coin selection a guaranteed double spend. After a restart the same amnesia covers records of every context, since hydration rebuilds the in-memory wallet without transaction history. It CAN be resolved one layer down: all three stores durably retain what upstream forgets, so each now re-evaluates upstream's own retain_unclaimed predicate - drop outpoints some surviving record still spends - against its unpruned history before honouring a release: - SQLite keeps every core_transactions record_blob past finalization. The release filter now subtracts the union of surviving rows' inputs, built lazily at most once per round and only when a batch's released set survives the in-round claimed_by_survivors filter; the common full-resend sweep releases nothing and pays nothing. - Swift and Kotlin already carry the attribution their release passes trust: the TXO's spender link, which the loser walk detaches and the by-outpoint release requires detached. The defect there was last-writer-wins linking - the loser's record pass stole the link from the settled spender, making the coin releasable. The link is now guarded: a network-final spender (IS-locked or better, not globally swept) keeps it, with the one DIP-10-sanctioned takeover - a chainlocked arrival over a spender that was only IS-locked, the same precedence upstream's sweep gate applies. The utxos_spent channel gets the same guard; unreachable for this defect today (upstream only classifies inputs against a still-present funding UTXO), but the invariant should not depend on that detail. In-session the in-memory wallet stays safe on its own - a released mark is never re-credited to utxos, and redelivery short-circuits on the known txid - so refusing the release at the store is what closes the cross-restart window, and it does so by construction: the guard's data lives in the store, not in rehydrated memory. The regression per backend is the reviewer scenario end to end: finalized F pruned upstream, loser L reusing F's input plus an attacker input, final W beating L on the attacker input, the release wrongly naming F's coin - asserting the settled coin stays spent across a restart while the coin only the loser claimed still comes free in the same batch. Each new test was run red against its backend's pre-guard code. This closes the release-trust half of the finding locally. The event surface itself still reports the wrong release to every other key-wallet consumer; that remains an upstream defect to file separately and does not gate this branch.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The persistence-side guard fixes the prior release of coins consumed by pruned finalized transactions, but three in-scope blockers remain at the exact head: stale mempool history can veto authoritative releases indefinitely, unstamped foreign-input tombstones permit permanent attacker-selected storage growth, and malformed stored claimant keys fail open. The public JNI/Kotlin contract also still contradicts the implemented ordered-batch and unstamped-tombstone behavior.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol; openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 3 blocking
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:299-344: Do not let stale mempool rows veto sweep releases
`surviving_stored_input_claims` treats every surviving transaction row as authoritative, including plain `Mempool` records. These rows have no expiry or removal path other than a later sweep, while wallet restoration deliberately does not repopulate ordinary transaction history. An evicted or abandoned mempool transaction can therefore survive only in storage. If a later loser claims the same coin and an authoritative sweep releases it, this stale row removes the coin from `released`; `apply_sweep` then attributes the coin to the unrelated winner and leaves it durably spent. This disagrees with both mobile backends, which preserve an existing spender link only when its record is network-final and allow a mempool link to be replaced. Restrict the durable-history veto to contexts that establish settled-spend evidence and add a restart or wallet-recreation regression covering a stale mempool claimant followed by an authoritative release.
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:576-589: Do not permanently retain attacker-owned foreign input tombstones
Every absent, non-released loser input becomes a durable placeholder without evidence that the wallet owns the outpoint. For an unmined InstantSend winner, `winner_mined_height` is NULL and the collector intentionally never removes the row. A peer can send this wallet a withheld incoming loser transaction containing many attacker-owned inputs, then obtain an InstantSend lock for a conflicting network transaction. The resulting sweep leaves one permanent, attacker-selected placeholder per foreign input; the same unstamped lifetime exists in Swift and Kotlin. Repeating the sequence with fresh fan-in inputs grows persistence and restore work indefinitely at transaction-fee cost. The sweep payload must carry an authoritative wallet-owned held-outpoint set, or an equivalent ownership signal, so absent-row tombstones are created only for genuine wallet claims while preserving spend-before-funding correctness.
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:329-337: Fail closed when decoding stored input claimants
`surviving_stored_input_claims` is the final persistence-side guard against releasing an already-consumed coin, but a `core_transactions.txid` with the wrong length silently executes `continue`. Its record blob is never decoded, so none of its input claims can veto the release. The schema does not constrain the BLOB length, and other typed-column readers return `WalletStorageError::BlobDecode` for malformed identifiers. This scan must likewise fail and roll back the round. It must also verify that the typed key equals `TransactionRecord::txid`, because the typed key decides whether the row is excluded as a swept loser.
In `packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/ffi/NativePersistenceBridge.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/ffi/NativePersistenceBridge.kt:310-322: Document the ordered batch and unstamped-hold JNI contract
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3847061150)
This public KDoc still says the callback fires once for the round and that `winnerMinedHeight == -1` means “no height, no tombstone.” JNI actually invokes it once per `SweepBatchFFI`, in emission order, and the Kotlin handler maps `-1` to a null height while retaining unresolved non-released inputs as durable, unstamped tombstones that no height collector removes. An out-of-tree backend following the current contract can collapse non-commutative batches or discard the only cross-restart hold while still declaring `CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL`. Align this KDoc and the matching obsolete comments in `packages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/persistence.rs:728-733`, `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift:1171-1179`, and `packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/dao/DocumentDao.kt:240-256` with the implemented ordered, unstamped-hold semantics.
| /// EVERY context count as claimants on purpose. A mined or chainlocked | ||
| /// record's spend is settled and may never be re-freed; an InstantSend- | ||
| /// locked record's inputs are settled under DIP-10 the moment the lock | ||
| /// lands; and a plain mempool record is a claim upstream itself would have | ||
| /// retained had it still held the record — refusing matches what | ||
| /// `retain_unclaimed` computes from an unpruned, unrestarted wallet, no | ||
| /// more and no less. In-session a live claimant never appears in a released | ||
| /// set anyway (upstream filters it), so any hit here is by construction a | ||
| /// claim upstream forgot. | ||
| /// | ||
| /// One pass over the wallet's rows, decoding each blob once — the same | ||
| /// build-the-set-then-probe shape (and rationale) as upstream's | ||
| /// `retain_unclaimed`: released sets follow the input count of a | ||
| /// transaction a remote peer picks, so probing per candidate would be | ||
| /// `O(released × history)` instead. The pass itself is `O(history)` blob | ||
| /// decodes, paid only by a round whose sweep actually frees candidate | ||
| /// coins — rare organically, and an attacker can only force one per | ||
| /// on-chain final transaction they pay for. | ||
| fn surviving_stored_input_claims( | ||
| tx: &Transaction<'_>, | ||
| wallet_id: &WalletId, | ||
| swept_txids: &HashSet<dashcore::Txid>, | ||
| ) -> Result<HashSet<dashcore::OutPoint>, WalletStorageError> { | ||
| use dashcore::hashes::Hash; | ||
|
|
||
| let mut stmt = | ||
| tx.prepare_cached("SELECT txid, record_blob FROM core_transactions WHERE wallet_id = ?1")?; | ||
| let mut rows = stmt.query(params![wallet_id.as_slice()])?; | ||
| let mut claims: HashSet<dashcore::OutPoint> = HashSet::new(); | ||
| while let Some(row) = rows.next()? { | ||
| let txid_bytes: Vec<u8> = row.get(0)?; | ||
| let Ok(txid_array) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(txid_bytes.as_slice()) else { | ||
| continue; | ||
| }; | ||
| if swept_txids.contains(&dashcore::Txid::from_byte_array(txid_array)) { | ||
| continue; | ||
| } | ||
| let blob_bytes: Vec<u8> = row.get(1)?; | ||
| let record: TransactionRecord = blob::decode(&blob_bytes)?; | ||
| claims.extend( | ||
| record | ||
| .transaction | ||
| .input | ||
| .iter() | ||
| .map(|input| input.previous_output), | ||
| ); |
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🔴 Blocking: Do not let stale mempool rows veto sweep releases
surviving_stored_input_claims treats every surviving transaction row as authoritative, including plain Mempool records. These rows have no expiry or removal path other than a later sweep, while wallet restoration deliberately does not repopulate ordinary transaction history. An evicted or abandoned mempool transaction can therefore survive only in storage. If a later loser claims the same coin and an authoritative sweep releases it, this stale row removes the coin from released; apply_sweep then attributes the coin to the unrelated winner and leaves it durably spent. This disagrees with both mobile backends, which preserve an existing spender link only when its record is network-final and allow a mempool link to be replaced. Restrict the durable-history veto to contexts that establish settled-spend evidence and add a restart or wallet-recreation regression covering a stale mempool claimant followed by an authoritative release.
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in 612d1d9 — Do not let stale mempool rows veto sweep releases no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
| if affected == 0 && !freed { | ||
| // A held input with no row gets a placeholder in EVERY sweep | ||
| // context — `CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL`'s contract: each non-released | ||
| // input retains a durable spend claim even when its funding | ||
| // TXO has not materialised yet. An IS-locked, unmined winner | ||
| // just leaves the stamp NULL, which the collector never | ||
| // touches — see the doc comment above for what resolves (and | ||
| // what bounds) an unstamped row. | ||
| tombstone_stmt.execute(params![ | ||
| wallet_id.as_slice(), | ||
| &key[..], | ||
| AsRef::<[u8]>::as_ref(superseded_by), | ||
| winner_mined_height.map(i64::from) | ||
| ])?; |
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🔴 Blocking: Do not permanently retain attacker-owned foreign input tombstones
Every absent, non-released loser input becomes a durable placeholder without evidence that the wallet owns the outpoint. For an unmined InstantSend winner, winner_mined_height is NULL and the collector intentionally never removes the row. A peer can send this wallet a withheld incoming loser transaction containing many attacker-owned inputs, then obtain an InstantSend lock for a conflicting network transaction. The resulting sweep leaves one permanent, attacker-selected placeholder per foreign input; the same unstamped lifetime exists in Swift and Kotlin. Repeating the sequence with fresh fan-in inputs grows persistence and restore work indefinitely at transaction-fee cost. The sweep payload must carry an authoritative wallet-owned held-outpoint set, or an equivalent ownership signal, so absent-row tombstones are created only for genuine wallet claims while preserving spend-before-funding correctness.
source: ['codex']
| let txid_bytes: Vec<u8> = row.get(0)?; | ||
| let Ok(txid_array) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(txid_bytes.as_slice()) else { | ||
| continue; | ||
| }; | ||
| if swept_txids.contains(&dashcore::Txid::from_byte_array(txid_array)) { | ||
| continue; | ||
| } | ||
| let blob_bytes: Vec<u8> = row.get(1)?; | ||
| let record: TransactionRecord = blob::decode(&blob_bytes)?; |
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🔴 Blocking: Fail closed when decoding stored input claimants
surviving_stored_input_claims is the final persistence-side guard against releasing an already-consumed coin, but a core_transactions.txid with the wrong length silently executes continue. Its record blob is never decoded, so none of its input claims can veto the release. The schema does not constrain the BLOB length, and other typed-column readers return WalletStorageError::BlobDecode for malformed identifiers. This scan must likewise fail and roll back the round. It must also verify that the typed key equals TransactionRecord::txid, because the typed key decides whether the row is excluded as a swept loser.
| let txid_bytes: Vec<u8> = row.get(0)?; | |
| let Ok(txid_array) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(txid_bytes.as_slice()) else { | |
| continue; | |
| }; | |
| if swept_txids.contains(&dashcore::Txid::from_byte_array(txid_array)) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| let blob_bytes: Vec<u8> = row.get(1)?; | |
| let record: TransactionRecord = blob::decode(&blob_bytes)?; | |
| let txid_array = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(txid_bytes.as_slice()).map_err(|_| { | |
| WalletStorageError::blob_decode("core_transactions.txid is not 32 bytes") | |
| })?; | |
| let stored_txid = dashcore::Txid::from_byte_array(txid_array); | |
| if swept_txids.contains(&stored_txid) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| let blob_bytes: Vec<u8> = row.get(1)?; | |
| let record: TransactionRecord = blob::decode(&blob_bytes)?; | |
| if record.txid != stored_txid { | |
| return Err(WalletStorageError::blob_decode( | |
| "core_transactions.txid disagrees with record_blob", | |
| )); | |
| } |
source: ['codex']
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Resolved in 612d1d9 — Fail closed when decoding stored input claimants no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
… spenders only, fail closed Two corrections to surviving_stored_input_claims, the release guard introduced by the previous commit. The veto is now settled-evidence only: a claimant row counts when its record is network-final (IS-locked, in-block, or chainlocked), never when it is a bare mempool record. A mempool row is the one context that can go stale forever - an evicted or abandoned mempool transaction has no removal path in this store other than a later sweep (upstream's abandon path emits no events, dashpay/rust-dashcore#976), and restoration deliberately does not repopulate ordinary history - so a stale claimant surviving a restart would veto an authoritative release, attribute the coin to an unrelated winner, and strand it durably spent: the mirror image of the wrong-release bug the veto exists to stop. This is also the rule the mobile stores already implement (their link guard protects a network-final spender and lets a mempool link be replaced), so the three backends now agree. A live mempool claim loses nothing: in-session upstream holds the record and never names its inputs released, and within the round claimed_by_survivors carries the changeset's own records of every context. The accepted trade: after a restart a still-alive mempool claimant no longer vetoes, so the coin may be transiently re-offered while that pending spend races - self-resolving, and strictly better than a permanent strand. The scan also fails CLOSED now. It is the final guard against re-crediting a consumed coin, so a corrupt claimant row must fail the round rather than silently losing its veto: a core_transactions.txid of the wrong length and a record blob whose decoded txid disagrees with its typed key (the key is what excludes a row as a swept loser) are both BlobDecode errors, matching the other typed-column readers. Both behaviors carry regressions run red against the pre-fix code: a stale mempool claimant followed by a restart and an authoritative release (the coin must come free), and a corrupt claimant key in a sweep round with release candidates (the round must roll back).
…nstamped-hold semantics Four comments still described the pre-1505912fbc design and, on the public JNI surface, misstated the invocation shape. The NativePersistenceBridge KDoc said the sweeps callback fires once for the round and that winnerMinedHeight == -1 means no height, no tombstone; JNI actually invokes it once per sweep batch in emission order - non-commutative, a later batch can keep spent a coin an earlier one freed - and a -1 winner retains every unresolved non-released input as a durable UNSTAMPED tombstone that no collector removes. An out-of-tree backend following the old words could collapse batches or drop the only cross-restart hold while still attesting CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL. The matching stale comments in the JNI emitter (rs-unified-sdk-jni), the Swift handler's winner-context note, and DocumentDao's collector doc (which still called unstamped rows legacy data no current writer produces) now state the same contract: the stamp keys a hold's lifetime, never its existence, and an unstamped hold resolves only through proof - funding arrival, a later block-context re-stamp, or a release.
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Preliminary review — Codex only
Two blocking persistence defects remain: unmined InstantSend sweeps can permanently retain attacker-selected foreign-input tombstones, and a malformed record keyed as a swept loser still bypasses key/blob consistency validation and can re-credit a consumed coin. The stale-mempool veto and public ordered-batch documentation are fixed, but one Swift collector comment still contradicts the implemented unstamped-hold behavior.
Source: reviewer backend gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 2 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)
2 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.swift:1023-1025: Correct the Swift collector's unstamped-tombstone comment
This comment says no current writer produces a nil stamp, but the unmined InstantSend sweep path deliberately maps a missing winner height to nil and writes that value onto durable tombstones. The surrounding method documentation and the writer at lines 1171-1185 already describe this as a current, intentional shape. State that nil stamps are live holds which must remain outside the height collector until funding materializes, a later block-context sweep stamps them, or an authoritative release removes them.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:612-625: Do not permanently retain attacker-owned foreign input tombstones
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3852028355)
Every absent, non-released loser input still receives a durable placeholder without evidence that the wallet owns the outpoint. For an unmined InstantSend winner, `winner_mined_height` remains NULL, and the collector deliberately excludes NULL stamps. A sender can directly deliver a withheld incoming loser containing many sender-owned inputs and then obtain an InstantSend lock for a conflicting winner; none of those foreign funding outputs will materialize for this wallet, so the resulting rows have no expected removal path. Repeating this fee-paying sequence with fresh fan-in inputs permanently grows wallet-scoped persistence and scan work. The documented missing upstream ownership signal explains why the current payload cannot distinguish these rows, but it does not bound the behavior introduced by this sweep path. Carry authoritative wallet-owned held outpoints from upstream, or provide an equivalently bounded representation while preserving genuine spend-before-funding holds.
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-platform-wallet-storage/src/sqlite/schema/core_state.rs:495: Fail closed when decoding stored input claimants
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/4406#discussion_r3852028358)
The new consistency validation still skips a malformed row whose typed key is itself listed as a swept loser. `surviving_stored_input_claims` checks `swept_txids` before decoding that row, while `apply_sweep` decodes the selected blob here without verifying that its embedded `TransactionRecord::txid` equals `loser_txid`. A corrupt row keyed as loser L but containing settled record F therefore bypasses the claimant veto and processes F's inputs as L's. If the sweep release set names an input consumed by F, the code can mark that coin unspent and delete the only stored claimant evidence. Validate the selected swept record against its lookup key before any deletion or input mutation, and add a regression whose mismatched typed key is included in the sweep batch; the existing mismatch test uses a non-swept key and does not cover this path.
| // A nil stamp is deliberately NOT back-filled: no current | ||
| // writer produces one, and stamping it here would convert | ||
| // "no proof of finality" into a fabricated horizon. |
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🟡 Suggestion: Correct the Swift collector's unstamped-tombstone comment
This comment says no current writer produces a nil stamp, but the unmined InstantSend sweep path deliberately maps a missing winner height to nil and writes that value onto durable tombstones. The surrounding method documentation and the writer at lines 1171-1185 already describe this as a current, intentional shape. State that nil stamps are live holds which must remain outside the height collector until funding materializes, a later block-context sweep stamps them, or an authoritative release removes them.
| // A nil stamp is deliberately NOT back-filled: no current | |
| // writer produces one, and stamping it here would convert | |
| // "no proof of finality" into a fabricated horizon. | |
| // A nil stamp is intentionally produced for an unmined | |
| // InstantSend winner. It remains outside this height collector | |
| // until funding materializes, a later block-context sweep stamps | |
| // it, or an authoritative release deletes it. |
source: ['codex']
4 participants
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
Bumps
rust-dashcorefrom173ffac0to639e70e0(tip ofdev), which brings indashpay/rust-dashcore#961 — a never-broadcast transaction no longer credits money that
does not exist — plus the seven commits ahead of the previous pin.
#961 adds
WalletEvent::TransactionsSwept, the first subtractive event on the walletbus: it names transactions the wallet removed because a later, final transaction provably
beat them to their inputs. Every field on our persistence seam was additive, so without
handling it the mirror keeps the dead rows, hands them back at the next load, and
re-creates the balance the wallet just corrected — the same bug #961 fixes, one layer up.
What was done?
Event routing (
platform-wallet) — three consumers matched exhaustively onWalletEvent:BalanceUpdateHandlerroutes it like any other balance-bearing variant; a sweep is theone event that can lower the balance, and its snapshot is post-removal.
TransactionInstantLockedis:a swept transaction can never confirm, so a matching
Pendingsent payment moves toFailed— the state machine's previously unwritten terminal — whileConfirmedis neverdemoted and a chainlocked reinstatement (whose record re-arrives confirmed) advances
Failedback toConfirmed.build_core_changesetprojects it into the newCoreChangeSet.sweeps(orderedSweepBatches — losers, winner, released outpoints), counted byis_empty_no_recordsso asweep-only round survives the filter that decides whether the persister is called at all.
Persistence seam — the round's
SweepBatches cross the FFI through the persistenceextension's size-negotiated
on_persist_wallet_changeset_sweeps_fn(see the ABI findingbelow for why they must not ride
WalletChangeSetFFIitself), fired right after thechangeset callback in the same round and applied batch by batch and in order (a later batch
can keep a coin spent that an earlier one freed), after the additive part of the round,
since the transaction that won the inputs usually rides in the same changeset:
PlatformWalletPersistenceHandler.persistWalletChangesetSweeps/applySweptTransaction(Swift),
onWalletChangesetTransactionsSwept(Kotlin, viatramp_persist_wallet_changeset_sweepsinrs-unified-sdk-jni), andcore_state::apply_sweep(SQLite) delete the transaction row; the outputs it createdcascade with it.
outpoints upstream named. A coin whose funding TXO hasn't materialized yet (the loser was
persisted before its own funding output was observed) has no row to hold, so a held-but-
unfunded input gets a durable placeholder of its own instead: SQLite writes a
core_utxosrow keyed by outpoint (
spent_in_txid), and Swift/Kotlin detach the pending-input row fromthe doomed loser and repoint it at the winner (
isSweptTombstone/supersededByTxid) sothe claim survives both the loser's cascade-delete and the funding TXO's own later arrival.
Seam hardening (shipped in this PR, review-driven):
Chained sweeps before funding. A held-but-unfunded pending-input tombstone (above) is
keyed to that sweep's winner. If the winner is itself swept later, the mobile backends'
staged-row lookup (
spendingTransactionTxid = :loserTxid) can no longer find it — italready detached from that relationship the first time. Both mobile backends therefore run
a second lookup by the scalar
spendingTxidthe tombstone was repointed to (Kotlin'sDocumentDao.sweptTombstonesTargetingwith an in-memory partition against the releasedset; the scalar reconciliation in Swift's
applySweptTransaction) and carry it the rest ofthe chain: deleted if a later sweep finally releases it, repointed at the new winner if
not. SQLite never had this defect —
apply_sweepalways re-derives a loser's inputs fromits own
core_transactionsblob and matchescore_utxosby outpoint alone, so aplaceholder is chain-safe without any relationship to detach from in the first place.
Sweep-support capability negotiation. A persister predating sweep support processes
the rest of a round, returns success, and never sees
sweepsat all — Rust would thentreat the round as durable and clear it, letting the removed transaction return after
restart. Added
PersistenceCapabilities::CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL(bit 10): the FFI persisteronly attests it when the host is structurally sweep-capable and explicitly declared the
bit (Swift's
makePersistenceCapabilities(), Kotlin'spersistenceCapabilitiesBits()), andthe wallet-event adapter (
core_bridge::commit_batch) now treatsstore()succeeding on asweep-bearing round as durable only when the backend attests it — otherwise it freezes that
wallet's sync watermark exactly like a
store()rejection (kotlin-sdk/platform-wallet: duplicated unspent TXO rows after SPV rescan following unclean shutdown (inflated balance) #4069's existingfail-closed guard), so a removal is never reported durable to a backend that cannot apply
it. All three in-tree backends (SQLite, Swift, Kotlin) now attest the bit.
Sweep transport off the unversioned changeset struct. Appending
sweeps/sweeps_counttoWalletChangeSetFFIwas safe in only one direction: the struct crossesthe C ABI by bare pointer with no size or version field, so the current Swift callback
installed against the previous native library (nothing prevents that pairing — the
callback signature and manager-create entry points are unchanged) would read
cs.sweeps_countand could dereferencecs.sweepsbeyond the end of the olderproducer's allocation: undefined behavior on an ordinary changeset round, which the
capability bit (semantics, not memory layout) cannot make safe. The struct is restored to
its released layout and the batches now ride
PersistenceCallbacksExtension— theexisting size-tagged transport — as
on_persist_wallet_changeset_sweeps_fn, appendedunder extension version 1 and read only when the host's declared
struct_sizeproves theslot exists.
CORE_SWEEP_REMOVAL's structural half is now that slot rather than thelegacy changeset pointer, whose unchanged signature proves nothing. Both cross-version
pairings are safe: an old host is simply never handed sweeps (and its watermark freezes
per the previous bullet), and a new host on an old library reads only the unchanged
struct prefix.
Detached tombstones survive the shared winner row's deletion (Swift). A first sweep
detaches unresolved pending inputs from multiple wallets and repoints them at winner W by
scalar
spendingTxid; when W's own record arrives,resolveInputOutpoint's(outpoint, spendingTxid)duplicate guard sees those tombstones and attaches nothing toW's row, so a later sweep of W lets the first wallet's callback delete the shared row
with another wallet's tombstones still naming it. That second wallet's callback used to
hit the missing-row early return and never apply its own release decision — a released
coin would resurrect spent under the obsolete W once funded, and a held tombstone could
never follow a further chained sweep.
applySweptTransactionnow runs the wallet-scopedscalar tombstone reconciliation regardless of whether the shared row still exists. Kotlin
never had the early return (its tombstone queries key on the scalar column and run
unconditionally) and SQLite's tables are
(wallet_id, …)-keyed with no shared rows;both are pinned by multi-wallet chained-sweep-before-funding confirmation tests.
JNI local-reference frames. The sweep-batch loop in
rs-unified-sdk-jni'stramp_persist_wallet_changesetbuilt each batch's arrays in the trampoline's own localframe; since the batch count is unbounded, a large enough changeset could exhaust ART's
local-reference table. Each batch's construction and callback invocation now run inside
their own
with_local_frame, matching the per-account loop just above it.One hold/release model on all three backends. The mobile drains give a sweep
tombstone priority over the newest-wins pick (records precede sweeps in a round, so the
winner's own pending row can coexist with the tombstone and must not delete it); every
hold names its winner (
supersededByTxid, mirroring SQLite'sspent_in_txid) so arestore-rescan re-delivering the funding output cannot resurrect a provably consumed
coin, while pre-stamp rows keep the old re-delivery backstop; releases apply by outpoint
on every backend (reaching claims that drained onto the TXO with no relationship left to
follow) and clear the stamp in the same statement; and every
isSpentwriter ismonotonic under a stamp, so the winner's own IS-locked arrival cannot flip a durable hold
back into the restore set. SQLite additionally applies a batch's released outpoints even
when the swept txid has no row (record loss must not swallow a release), and its
co-swept-parent skip is scoped to parents whose row is actually on hand to delete.
Sweeps cascade beyond the transaction tables. A sweep now drops the tracked asset
locks its losers funded (through the changeset's existing
removedchannel, with achainlocked reinstatement re-inserting via reconstruction) and fails the matching
Pendingsent DashPay payments, as described under event routing above.How Has This Been Tested?
swept_transaction_projection_tests(core_bridge.rs): the arm names the dead txids andnothing else, survives
is_empty_no_records, and dedupes across a merged round.cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib— 686 passed, including thesweep_without_declared_capability_freezes_the_wallet_despite_a_successful_store/sweep_with_declared_capability_does_not_freezeadapter-loop tests for the capability gate.sqlite_transaction_sweeps.rs:cargo test -p platform-wallet-storage— all green,including the chained-sweep-before-funding tests and the new
a_multi_wallet_chained_sweep_before_funding_reconciles_each_wallets_own_tombstonesconfirming SQLite's
(wallet_id, …)-keyed design needed no fix for either finding.platform-wallet-ffiunit tests —cargo test -p platform-wallet-ffi --lib, 276 passed —including
a_legacy_sized_extension_refuses_the_sweeps_slot_but_keeps_dpns(alegacy-declared
struct_sizemust make Rust refuse the sweeps slot rather than read it),core_sweep_removal_requires_the_extension_slot_and_the_declaration, the extensionappend-only layout pins, and
store_delivers_sweeps_through_the_extension_slot_after_the_changeset(in-order,after-the-changeset delivery; a slot-less host still succeeds with sweeps undelivered).
SweptTransactionPersistTests.swift: the row and its outputs go, the funding transactionstays, the claimed coin becomes spendable again, an unknown txid is a no-op, a tombstone
survives (or correctly moves through) a second sweep, and the new
testSharedWinnerDeletedByAnotherWalletsCallbackStillReconcilesThisWalletsTombstonesmulti-wallet chained-sweep-before-funding regression, plus the review-round pins: the
coexisting winner-row drain, the stamped-hold re-delivery pair, the by-outpoint release
reaching a drained claim, and the record-pass/spent-emit downgrade guards pinned
independently. Full
SwiftDashSDKTestssuite on the iPhone 17 simulator — 360 passed.PlatformWalletPersistenceHandlerTest:sweptTransactionIsDeletedAndReleasesItsSpendClaim,sweptTransactionRollsBackWithItsRound(the deletion is staged in the round's bufferedtransaction, so a failed round must not take the rows with it), the chained-sweep pair,
and the new multi-wallet
sharedWinnerDeletedByAnotherWalletsCallbackStillReconcilesThisWalletsTombstonesconfirmation test, plus the review-round pins (coexisting winner-row drain, stamped-hold
re-delivery and its pre-stamp backstop, released-marker clearing, the spent-emit
downgrade guard, the two-wallet released-pending deadlock, and the capability-guarded
sweep-slot default).
:sdk:testDebugUnitTest— 329 passed across the suite, 99 in thisclass. (No Room schema change in any round: no new columns, no migration.)
reverted, run, restored) before being counted above. The Kotlin/SQLite multi-wallet tests
are confirmations of designs that needed no fix, so they have no revert to fail against.
cargo check --workspace --all-targetsandcargo fmt --all -- --checkclean.Not exercised on a device or against live sync: no wallet was driven into an actual
double-spend to watch the sweep arrive end to end.
Breaking Changes
WalletChangeSetFFIkeeps its released layout — an earlier revision of this PR appended thesweep fields to it, which review found unsafe in the new-callback-on-old-library direction,
so the payload moved to
PersistenceCallbacksExtension's size-negotiatedon_persist_wallet_changeset_sweeps_fninstead (appended under extension version 1; olderextensions fail closed by declared
struct_size, so this is not a C ABI break either).NativePersistenceBridgegains anopen funwhose inherited body consults the subclass'sown declared capability bits: a subclass that declares
CORE_SWEEP_REMOVALwithoutoverriding the slot fails the round (declared removals must never be silently swallowed
under an advancing watermark), while a non-attesting subclass keeps a benign success (its
watermark is stripped Rust-side anyway).
The behavioral story stands: a backend that does not both wire the extension's sweeps slot
and declare
CORE_SWEEP_REMOVALis deliberately treated as not supporting sweep removal —the wallet-event adapter freezes that wallet's durable sync watermark on every sweep-bearing
round rather than trust a
store()success that never carried the removal (see the"Sweep-support capability negotiation" bullet above). This is intentional fail-closed
behavior, not a regression — silently losing the removal was the bug — but any out-of-tree
persister that implements sweep removal must supply the extension callback and add the bit to
its declared capabilities to avoid a spurious watermark freeze.
Checklist:
For repository code-owners and collaborators only
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
CORE_SWEEP_REMOVALpersistence capability so a backend must explicitly attest sweep-removal support before its sync watermark is trusted to advance through a sweep.Bug Fixes
Tests