chore(deps): update module golang.org/x/crypto to v0.56.0 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
golang.org/x/crypto	v0.52.0 → v0.56.0

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Source-address critical option not enforced for non-public-key auth callbacks in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh

CVE-2026-56854 / GO-2026-6303

More information

Details

The source-address critical option in the Permissions returned by an authentication callback was only enforced for the PublicKeyCallback and VerifiedPublicKeyCallback paths, extending the fix for CVE-2026-46595. Permissions returned by the PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, NoClientAuthCallback, and GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin callbacks were not validated against the client's remote address, so a source-address restriction set by those callbacks was silently ignored. The check is now applied to the Permissions returned by any authentication callback.

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://go.dev/issue/80213
• https://go.dev/cl/797040

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Prevent DoS on deadlocked undecided channel in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh

CVE-2026-78662 / GO-2026-6354

More information

Details

Previously, a channel registered in the mux's chanList is not usable until it is established. A malicious peer was able flood the channel's incomingRequests, deadlocking the entire connection.

Now, we add an atomic established state, set when a channel becomes usable. Until such a time, handlePacket drops every packet other than the open confirmation/failure, without blocking and without tearing down the connection.

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://go.dev/issue/81316
• https://go.dev/cl/826504
• https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/1y3fb2np35U

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Prevent DoS on deadlocked established channel in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh

CVE-2026-56855 / GO-2026-6355

More information

Details

Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection.

Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking.

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://go.dev/issue/81317
• https://go.dev/cl/826524
• https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/1y3fb2np35U

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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